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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND THE REQUIREMENT
OF ADEQUATE TREATMENT
DOUGLAS G. SMITH *
Abstract: This Article examines the constitutional concerns raised by, and
compares the costs and benefits associated with, the civil commitment of
sexually violent predators. Specifically, it focuses on the State of Washing-
ton's civil commitment program, the oldest such program in the United
States and the only program in the nation to have its constitutional pa-
rameters fully litigated. In large measure, the litigation surrounding Wash-
ington's civil commitment program has defined the scope of the constitu-
tional rights of civilly committed individuals to constitutionally adequate
treatment. At the same time, it has demonstrated many of the problems as-
sociated with such programs and provides an important case study in as-
sessing their costs and benefits. This Article concludes that, in addition to
the potential constitutional concerns regarding civil commitment, the
costs of civil conunitment appear to outweigh its benefits. As a result, in-
creasing criminal penalties for crimes of sexual violence may be a superior
alternative.
INTRODUCTION
In March 2007, the United States District Court for the Western
District of Washington dissolved "a history-making injunction" that gov-
erned the treatment of "sexually violent predators" who had been civilly
committed at Washington's Special Commitment Center ("SCC" ).t The
injunction was the product of litigation brought by SCC residents who,
more than seventeen years earlier, had alleged that the conditions of
their confinement violated their civil rights. 2
* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP. J.D., 1996, Northwestern University School of Law;
M.B.A., 1999, The University of Chicago; B.S./B.A., 1992/1993, State University of New
York at Buffalo. The author thanks Rudy Mehrbani for his assistance in the preparation of
this article. The opinions expressed in this article are personal to the author and do not
necessarily reflect the opinions of Kirkland & Ellis LLP or its clients.
I See Turay v. Richards (Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Inju nction), No. C91-0664RSM,
2007 WL 983132, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007). The author represents one of the SCC
residents in his pending appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
2 See id.
1383
1384	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1383
The nearly two-decade-long history of the SCC litigation demon-
strates the substantial constitutional difficulties associated with the civil
commitment of sexually violent predators.' Civil commitment laws are
motivated by good intentions—to protect the public from individuals
who may pose a significant danger. 4 Individuals who are civilly commit-
ted, however, receive significant constitutional protections that place
government officials in a quandary.' On the one hand, there are sub-
stantial benefits produced by the continued incarceration of individuals
who pose a potential risk to society.' On the other hand, there are sig-
nificant monetary costs in providing sexually violent predators with
constitutionally adequate treatment.?
The U.S. Supreme Court has made clear, however, that adequate
treatment is a fundamental prerequisite to any civil commitment pro-
gram.8 Without adequate treatment providing a path to an individual's
potential release, civil commitment becomes state-imposed criminal
punishment, but a civilly committed individual lacks the procedural
protections typically afforded a criminal defendant. 9 Nonetheless, the
Court has not formulated specific requirements for a constitutionally
adequate treatment program for civilly committed individuals.'" As a
result, lower courts have been forced to develop their own frameworks
for evaluating the constitutionality of civil commitment programs."
This Article addresses the constitutional concerns present in a civil
commitment program for sexually violent predators, as well as the costs
5 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5; Turay v.
Seling (Nou 13, 1999 Order), No. C91-664WD; slip op. at 6-18 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1999).
4 See Michael Vitiello, Punishing Sex Offenders: When Good Intentions Go Bad, 40 Ana. ST.
Li. 651, 651-54 (2008) (discussing the legislative motives underlying civil commitment
statutes).
5 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261-62 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,
356-58 (1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368-71 (1986).
6 See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 653-54.
7 See id. at 680.
a See Seling, 531 U.S. at 261-62; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
9 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366; Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Reme-
dies to Achieve Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HAs-rmros L.J. 1325, 1329-30 (1991) (discussing the difficulties in identify-
ing the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings); Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora's
Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1234-35
(2004) (discussing the criminal procedural safeguards that are lost in civil commitment
proceedings).
'° See Seling, 531 U.S. 250; Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346; Allen. 478 U.S. 364.
11 See, e.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ohlinger v. Wat-
son, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980)); Turay v. Seling (Nou 25, 1998 Order), No. C91-
664WD, slip op. at 11-12 (W.D. Wash. No 25, 1998).
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and benefits associated with such programs. Specifically, this Article
focuses on the State of Washington's civil commitment program, the
oldest such program in existence in the United States." It is the only
program in the nation in which the constitutional parameters of the
treatment program have been fully litigated. 13 From its inception,
Washington's civil commitment program has been the subject of sig-
nificant litigation, and that litigatiOn has defined the scope of a civilly
committed individual's right to constitutionally adequate treatment. At
the same time, the litigation has demonstrated many of the problems
associated with civil commitment programs and provides an important
case study in assessing their costs and benefits."
Part I discusses the SCC litigation's lengthy history." Part 11 ana-
lyzes the U.S. Supreme Court's approach to assessing the constitutional-
ity of statutes authorizing civil conunitment. 16 Part II also details the
conditions under which an individual may be deprived of his liberty
without access to usual constitutional protections and examines the
Court's jurisprudence restricting states' ability to impose indefinite in-
carceration." Part III addresses the framework for evaluating whether a
treatment program is constitutionally adequate and details the specific
elements of a constitutionally adequate treatment program. 18 Part IV
first discusses the SCC's continued failure to adhere to court orders, a
failure that resulted in the district court citing the SCC for contempt of
court." It concludes by discussing the district court's lifting of the con-
tempt sanctions and dissolution of the injunction, despite the SCC's en-
gagement in prohibited "backsliding."20 Finally, Part V addresses the re-
lationship between constitutional treatment standards and the
constitutionality of civil commitment programs generally. 21 It also exam-
" See infra notes 138-379 and accompanying text.
Is See infra notes 138-379 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 138-379 and accompanying text.
15 See infra notes 24-48 and accompanying text.
115 See infra notes 49-137 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 49-137 and accompanying text. The Court's decisions on the consti-
tutionality of civil commitment have been widely cited in assessing the constitutionality of
the detention of individuals ranging from the mentally ill to enemy combatants detained
in the war on terror. See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507,557 (2003) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358); id. at 592 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing
Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358); Michael Louis Corrado, Say Offenders, Unlawful Combatants, and
Preventive Detention, 84 N.C. L. Rev. 77,80 (2005); Stephen J. Morse, Uncontrollable Urges and
Irrational People, 88 VA. L. MEN. 1025,1054-76 (2002).
18 See infra notes 138-198 and accompanying text.
IP See infra notes 199-250 and accompanying text.
20 See infra notes 251-342 and accompanying text.
2' See infra notes 343-359 and accompanying text.
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ines the difficulties in ensuring government compliance in operating
constitutionally adequate treatment programs22 and concludes by dis-
cussing increased criminal penalties for sex offenders as an alternative
to civil commitment programs."
I. A HISTORY OF THE SCC LITIGATION
In 1994, a federal jury in the State of Washington found that
Washington's Special Commitment Center ("SCC") was not providing
residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. 24 As a result, Judge
William L. Dwyer issued an injunction (the "Turay Injunction") re-
quiring the SCC to bring its treatment program into compliance with
constitutional requiremen ts. 25
The Turay Injunction imposed broad requirements on the SCC to
(1) adopt and implement a plan for hiring and training competent
therapists, (2) implement strategies to rectify the lack of trust between
the residents and SCC staff, (3) implement a treatment program that
involves residents' spouses and family members and contains other
generally accepted therapy components, (4) develop individual treat-
ment plans for each resident to measure progress, and (5) provide an
expert in sex offender treatment to supervise and consult with SCC
staff. 26 Because the SCC was slow to comply with the Turay Injunction,
the district court subsequently appointed a special master, Dr. Janice
Marques, to oversee the SCC and provide the court with periodic re-
ports regarding the SCC's compliance. 27
In October 1998, Judge Dwyer conducted an evidentiary hearing
to assess the SCC's progress, and in November 1998, he issued an order
both fmding that the SCC had not complied with the Turay Injunction
and identifying a detailed list of unaddressed items." The court de-
manded that the SCC, among other things, (1) provide additional staff
training, (2) develop a coherent and individualized treatment program
for each resident, (3) formulate adequate procedures for residents'
" See infra notes 343-359 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 360-379 and accompanying text.
24 See Turay v. Weston (Thray Injunction), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash.
June 6, 1994).
29 See id. at 4-5.
28 id.
Turay v. Weston (Order Appointing Special Master), No. C91-664WD (W.D. Wash. Sept.
22, 1994); Turay v. Weston (First Supplemental Order Regarding Injunction), No. C91-664WD
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 22, 1994).
29 Turay v. Seling {Nov. 25, 1998 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 3, 10-15 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 25, 1998).
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families to participate in treatment, (4) construct a separate treatment-
oriented facility, (5) eliminate routine strip searches of SCC residents,
(6) eliminate the monitoring of residents' telephone calls and remove
its prohibition on outgoing calls, (7) develop improved meal and activ-
ity schedules, (8) improve the treatment environment, (9) implement
fair and reasonable grievance procedures and behavior management
plans, (10) implement an oversight program consisting of an internal
review process and an external body, and (11) make a constitutionally
adequate program a reality. 29 After noting the SCC's "history of non-
compliance with the Turay Injunction," the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit later affirmed Judge Dwyer's order, holding that the
district court correctly found that the SCC was providing residents with
constitutionally inadequate treatments°
The SCC, however, continued to provide constitutionally inade-
quate treatment to residents even after the Ninth. Circuit's decision.si
hi November 1999, following another evidentiary hearing, Judge Dwyer
held the SCC in contempt for failing to take reasonable steps to comply
with the Turay Injunction and his NoVember 1998 order." Over the
next several years, the SCC still failed to comply with the district court's
orders, and, as a result, contempt sanctions accumulated."
After Judge Dwyer's death in 2000, the case was reassigned to
Judge Barbara Rothstein and then-Judge Robert Lasnik. 34 In June 2004,
Judge Lasnik dissolved many elements of the Turay Injunction and
purged Judge Dwyer's 1999 contempt order. 35 Nonetheless, Judge Las-
nik still found that the SCC had failed to satisfy the constitutional re-
-
quirements regarding "the development and funding of an off-island
LRA," or. "Less Restrictive Alternative" placement to facilitate residents'
Id. at 12-14.
3° Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166,1172-74 (9th Cir. 2000).
si See, e.g., Turay v. Seling (Nov. 15, 1999 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 4-5 (W.D.
Wash. Nov. 15, 1999) (describing the goal of providing constitutionally adequate treatment
as unattained); Turay v. Seling (Order on Renewed Motions for Contempt and Dissolution of In-
junction), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash. May 27, 1999) (holding that the SCC
still failed to meet constitutional minimum requirements for providing mental health
treatment).
"Nov. 15, 1990 Order, slip op. at 6,22.
as
	
Turay Seling (May 5, 2000 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 16 (W.D. Wash.
May 5, 2000).
" See Turay v. Seling (June 10, 2004 Order), No. C91-0664L, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash.
June 10, 2004) (noting the case's previous presiding judges); Turay v. Seling (Order Trans-
ferring Cases), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 18, 2002).
33 June 10, 2004 Order, slip op. at 10.
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return to the community upon successful treatment.36 Judge Lasnik
further held that dissolution of the injunction would be conditioned on
a lack of significant "backsliding" by the SCC in meeting the Turay In-
junction's original requirements." The Ninth Circuit subsequently af-
firmed Judge Lasnik's order. 38
After the case was reassigned to Judge Ricardo Martinez,39 the
SCC moved to dissolve the Turay Injunction's remaining provisions. 40
In response, residents submitted extensive evidence demonstrating that
the SCC had engaged in the "backsliding" specifically prohibited by
Judge Lasnik's order.'" This evidence included (1) reports issued by the
Inspection of Care Committee ("IOC committee" or "IOCC"), a group
comprised of independent experts appointed by the SCC, which found
that the facility's treatment program was inadequate, (2) a declaration
from an IOCC expert confirming that the SCC's treatment program
did not meet constitutional requirements, (3) several affidavits from
residents documenting SCC violations, and (4) a recommendation by
Dr. Janice Marques, the former special master, that the Turay injunc-
tion be main ta ined. 42
Despite the evidence presented, the district court denied the plain-
tiffs' request for an evidentiary hearing, 43 and on March 23, 2007, the
court dissolved the Turay Injunction entirely, abruptly terminating
nearly two decades of judicial oversight, despite the SCC's niinimal pro-
gress in complying with the terms of the court's injunction." The dis-
trict court specifically found that the "plaintiffs have demonstrated that
some backsliding has occurred with respect to the treatment program at
issue in this case."43 Moreover, it observed that "[t] his case has been
troublesome to the Court in that there seems to be no right answer, and
36 Id. at 3, 7-8.
37 Id. at 10.
38 Cunningham v. Weston, 180 Fed. App'x 644, 646 (9th Cir. 2006).
36 Turay v. Seling (Reassignment Order), No, C91-664RSM (W.D. Wash. July 6, 2004).
4° See Turay v. Richards (Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction), No. C91—
0664RSM, 2007 WL 983132, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007).
41 See id. at *3-5.
42 Id.; Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Turay v. Richards, No. C91-664RSM (W.D.
Wash. Sept. 18, 2006) [hereinafter Sept. 18, 2006 Transcript]; Declaration of Janice K.
Marques § 19, Turay v. Richards, No. C91-664RSM (W.D. Wash, Apr. 14, 2006) [hereinaf-
ter Marques Declaration].
43 Turay v. Richards (July 26, 2006 Order on Scope of Hearing), No. C91-0664RSM, slip
op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. July 26, 2006).
44 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *5.
49 Id. at *3.
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no good fix for the situation these plaintiffs face at the SCC."46 Nonethe-
less, the court dismissed the residents' objections by summarily stating,
without explanation, that the SCC's backsliding did not "rise to the level
of a Constitutional violation."47 The court explained that it dissolved the
Turay Injunction because, although the resident's disputed that the SCC
had implemented an effective LRA protocol, there was "no dispute" that
the SCC had constructed an off-island LRA.48
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S CIVIL COMMITMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Supreme Court has addressed the constitutionality of civil
commitment in three cases: Allen v. Illinois, Kansas v. Hendricks, and Sel-
ing v. Young." In those cases, the Court has made clear that the Due
Process Clause prohibits states from imposing "punishment" under the
guise of civil remedies." As a result, in order for civil commitment
schemes to pass constitutional muster, states must provide treatment
when individuals are treatable, 51 but the Court has not detailed what
treatment, exactly, the Constitution requires.52 Instead, the Court has
focused on the criteria used to determine when an individual will be
subject to civil commitment." As a result, although it is clear that
treatment is an essential element of the due process requirement, the
exact parameters of such treatment remain unclear."
A. Allen v. Illinois: Determining Whether a Civil Commitment Program
Imposes Punishment
One of the first instances in which the Court evaluated a statutory
scheme authorizing civil commitment for sexually violent predators was
46 Id. at *5.
47 Id. at *3-4.
48 Id. at *2-3, 4'5.
42 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250,258 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346,350
(1997); Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364,365 (1986).
6° See Seling, 531 U.S. at 256-57; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 348; Allen 478 U.S. at 373-74.
51 Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307,326 (1982) (Blackmun,]., concurring). As early
as 1982, Justice Blackmun noted in his concurrence in Youngberg that there may be situa-
tions in which "commitment without any 'treatment' whatsoever would not bear a reason-
able relation to the purposes of the person's confinement" and would thereby render it
unconstitutional. Id. The treatment requirement was later confirmed in decisions such as
Allen, Hendricks, and Seling. See infra notes 55-137.
52 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 261-62; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 347-48; Allen, 478 U.S. at 369-70.
53 See, e.g., Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 280-81 (evaluating Kansas's statutory criteria for
committing sexual offenders).
54 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 261-62; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 347-48; Allen, 978 U.S. at 369-70.
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in Allen v. Illinois. 55 In Allen, the Court held that the Illinois Sexually
Dangerous Persons Act was not a "criminal" statute and that individuals
in proceedings under the Act could therefore not invoke the Fifth
Amendment's guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination. 58 In
determining whether the statute was "criminal" in nature, the Court
assessed whether the statute was punitive in either purpose or effect. 57
In making this determination, the Court found it significant that the
Act required the State to provide "care and treatment for [persons ad-
judged sexually dangerous] ... in a facility set aside to provide psychi-
atric care" and that "[i]f the patient is found to be no longer danger-
ous, the court shall order that he be discharged."58
The Court, however, did not confine its investigation strictly to the
statutory text. 59 The Court also examined the effect of the statute and
decided that the record did not demonstrate that individuals had been
"confined under conditions incompatible with the State's asserted in-
terest in treatment."60 The Court, however, was not presented with an
opportunity to articulate what constituted sufficient treatment to sup-
port a determination that the statute was non-punitive and therefore
"civil," as the record contained "little or nothing about the regimen at
the psychiatric center."61 Accordingly, in the absence of contrary evi-
dence, the Court could not "say that the conditions of [the] petitioner's
confinement themselves amount to 'punishment' and thus render
`criminal' the proceedings which led to confinement." 62
The dissent agreed that treatment was a critical factor in assessing
whether a statute was punitive and therefore "criminal."63 It noted that
"[t]he Illinois Supreme Court ha[d] stated unambiguously that 'treat-
55 478 U.S. at 375.
56 Id. at 364-65.
57 Id. at 369 (citing United Slates v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980)).
" Id. (quoting the Illinois statute in force in 1985); see id. at 373 ("[T] he State serves
its purpose of treating rather than punishing sexually dangerous persons by committing
them to an institution expressly designed to provide psychiatric care and treatment."); see
also 725 h.L. COMP. STAT. ANN. 205/8 to /9 (LexisNexis 2008) (current amended version
of statute in dispute in Allen).
59 See Allen, 478 U.S. at 373-74.
tho Id. at 373.
61 Id. at 373-75.
ss Id. at 374. The Court did observe that, during oral argument, "counsel for the State
assured] [the Court] that under Illinois law sexually dangerous persons must not be
treated like ordinary prisoners," which suggested that confinement conditions were non-
punitive. See id.
65 See id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ment, not punishment, is the aim of the statute.'" 64 It further observed,
however, that "[a] goal of treatment is not sufficient, in and of itself to
render inapplicable the Fifth Amendment, or to prevent a characteriza-
tion of proceedings as `criminal.'" 65
In other words, the label applied to a statute by the legislature is
not dispositive.6 Rather, both the majority and dissent agreed that
courts must undertake an inquiry into the actual effect of the statute,
including whether the stated goal of "treatment" is manifested in prac-
tice.67 Nonetheless, because the record was not well-developed, the
Court did not articulate the specific elements of a constitutionally ade-
quate treatment program." Accordingly, lower courts were left to de-
velop the constitutional parameters of the treatment requirement. 69
B. Kansas V. Hendricks: Evaluating the Statutory Standards
for Civil Commitment
In Kansas v. Hendricks, the Court addressed the constitutionality of
a similar statute, Kansas's Sexually Violent Predator Act." That statute
64 Allen, 478 U.S. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting People V. Allen, 481 N.E.2d
690, 695 (El. 1985)).
Id. As the dissent explained:
With respect to a conventional criminal statute, if a State declared that its
goal was "treatment" and "rehabilitation," it is obvious that the Fifth Amend-
ment would still apply. The sexually-dangerous-person proceeding similarly
may not escape a characterization as "criminal" simply because a goal is 'treat-
ment." If this were not the case, moreover, nothing would prevent a State
from creating an entire corpus of "dangerous person" statutes to shadow its
criminal code. Indeterminate commitment would derive from proven viola-
tions of criminal statutes, combined with findings of mental disorders and
"criminal propensities," and constitutional protections for criminal defen-
dants would be simply inapplicable.
Id.
116 See id. at 373 (majority opinion); id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
67 See id. at 373-75 (majority opinion).
68 See id.
69 See, e.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Ohlinger v.
Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir. 1980)); Turay v. Seling (Nov. 25, 1998 Order), No. C91-
664WD, slip op. at 11-12 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 1998).
70 521 U.S. at 350. The Hendricks decision has been the subject of significant academic
commentary. See generally Lucy Berliner, Sex Offenders: Policy and Practice, 92 Nw. U. L. REV,
1203 (1998); Steven I. Friedland, On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex
Offenders, 70 U. CoLo. L. Rev. 73 (1999); Eric S. Janus, Foreshadowing the Future of Kansas v.
Hendricks: Lessons from Minnesota's Sex Offender Commitment Litigation, 92 Nw. U. L. REV.
1279 (1998); Grant H. Morris, The Evil That Men Do: Perverting Justice to Punish Perverts,
2000 U. ILL. L. Rev. 1199; Michael L. Perlin, "There's No Success Like Failure/And Failure's No
Success at All": Exposing the Pretextuality of Kansas v. Hendricks, 92 Nw. U. L. REv. 1247
1392	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1383
established procedures for the civil commitment of indivichials who had
a "mental abnormality" or a "personality disorder" that caused them to
engage in "predatory acts of sexual violence." The Kansas Supreme
Court invalidated the Act by ruling that it violated due process. 72 In
particular, the court held that the Act was defective because it did not
require a finding of "mental illness" before an individual was subject to
commitment, but only required that the individual suffer from a "men-
tal abnormality." The court further held the program violated due
process because the state was not providing constitutionally adequate
treatment. 74
A divided U.S. Supreme Court reversed the Kansas Supreme
Court's decision and held that the Act was constitutional. 75 In the ma-
jority opinion, Justice Thomas observed that "[a]lthough freedom from
physical restraint 'has always been at the core of the liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause from arbitrary governmental action,' [the] lib-
erty interest is not absolute"6 and thus, "an individual's constitutionally
protected interest in avoiding physical restraint may be overridden
even in the civil context."'" Accordingly, the government had the au-
thority in "narrow circumstances" to detain individuals who were un-
able to control their behavior and consequently posed a danger to pub-
lic health and safety. 78 The Court also observed that it had "consistently
upheld such involuntary commitment statutes provided the confine-
(1998); Christopher Slobogin, &jurisprudence of Dangerousness, 98 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1 (2003);
Elizabeth A. Weeks, The Newly Found "Cornpassion" for Sexually Violent Predators: Civil Commit-
ment and the Right to Treatment in the Wake of Kansas v. Hendricks, 32 GA. L. Rev. 1261
(1998); Note, Involuntary Commitment of Violent Sexual Predators, 111 Hmtv. L. REV. 259
(1997).
71 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 59-29a0) to -29a22 (1994). The Act defined a "mental abnor-
mality" as a "congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capac-
ity which predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree constitut-
ing such person a menace to the health and safety of others." Id. § 59-29a02(13).
72 See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 138 (Kan. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Kansas v.
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
n See id. at 137-38. The Kansas statute specifically provided that "kJ he involuntary de-
tention or commitment ... shall conform to constitutional requirements for care and
treatment." KAN STAT. ANN. § 59-29a09. It also provided for periodic review to determine
whether an individual's condition had sufficiently improved to warrant release. See id.
§§ 59-29a08, 59-29a10 to -29a11.
74 See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136.
75 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 370.
76 Id. at 356 (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992)).
77 Id.
78 See id. at 357.
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ment takes place pursuant to proper procedures and evidentiary stan-
dards."78
In particular, the Court made clear that although "[a] finding of
dangerousness, standing alone, is ordinarily not a sufficient ground
upon which to justify indefinite involuntary commitment," it had "sus-
tained civil commitment statutes when they have coupled proof of
dangerousness with the proof of some additional factor such as a
'mental illness' or 'mental abnormality.'" 8° The Court also rejected
the distinction drawn by the Kansas Supreme Court between "mental
illness" and a "mental abnormality,"81 and found that the Kansas stat-
ute survived constitutional scrutiny because it limited civil confine-
ment to individuals who "suffer from a volitional impairment render-
ing them dangerous beyond their control." 82
Likewise, the Court found that the Act, as a whole, was not "puni-
tive" in nature." The majority asserted that "none of the parties argue
that people institutionalized under the Kansas general civil commit-
ment statute are subject to punitive conditions. "84 Nonetheless, the
Court went on to discuss the general parameters for ascertaining
when a civil commitment statute imposes "punishment" that conflicts
with the due process requirement. 85 The Court noted that 'the mere
fact that a person is detained does not inexorably lead to the conclu-
sion that the government has imposed punishment.'"86 The Court
added, "The State may take measures to restrict the freedom of the
dangerously mentally ill. This is a legitimate nonpunitive governmen-
tal objective and has been historically so regarded." 87 Although the
Court acknowledged that Kansas's civil commitment statute might
lead to prolonged confinement because the commitment's purpose
was "to hold the person until his mental abnormality no longer causes
him to be a threat to others," it was not imposing punishment. 88
79 Id. (citing Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80; Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S, 418,426-27 (1979)).
ea Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312,314-15 (1993); Allen,
478 U.S. at 366; Minnesota av rel. Pearson v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 309 U.S. 270,
271-72 (1940)).
81 Id. at 358-59.
82 Id. at 358.
88 Id. at 369.
84 Id. at 363.
88 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 363-64.
56 Id. at 363 (quoting United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739,746 (1987)).
87 Id.
88 Id. at 363-64. The Court later determined that the government need not show that
an individual has a total or complete lack of control to satisfy the requirements for civil
commitment under Hendricks. See Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407,411 (2002). See generally
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The majority also specifically addressed the Kansas Supreme
Court's determination that the lack of "any legitimate 'treatment"
provided by the State violated the Due Process Clause. 99 The Court
again provided little guidance regarding the elements of a constitu-
tionally adequate treatment program. 9° The Kansas Supreme Court
had suggested that the plaintiff's condition was in fact "untreatable"
and that "falbsent a treatable mental illness, ... [the plaintiff] could
not be detained against his will."91 The Court, however, held that civil
confinement was permissible even in cases where the detainee's con-
dition was not treatable, because "incapacitation may be a legitimate
end" of a civil corrunitment statute. 92 The Court held the Constitution
merely requires that treatment be provided where a condition is
treatable. 93
The Court further concluded that, to the extent the Kansas Su-
preme Court found the plaintiff was in fact treatable and that there
was a defect in the treatment provided, the Due Process Clause was
still satisfied. 94 The Court noted that the Kansas statute specifically
required that treatment be provided95 but suggested in a footnote that
Steve C. Lee, Recent Developments, How Little Control?: Volition and the Civil Confinement of
Sexually Violent Predators in Kansas v. Crane, 26 Hmtv. J.L. & PUB. POCY 385 (2002).
89 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 365.
9° See id. at 365-68.
91 Id. at 365 (citing In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 136).
92 Id. at 365-66 (citing O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 584 (1975) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring); Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 375 (1956)). The Court further
observed:
While we have upheld state civil commitment statutes that aim both to inca-
pacitate and to treat, we have never held that the Constitution prevents a
State from civilly detaining those for whom no treatment is available, but who
nevertheless pose a danger to others. A State could hardly be seen as further-
ing a "punitive" purpose by inmluntarily confining persons afflicted with an
untreatable, highly contagious disease. Similarly, it would be of little value to
require treatment as a precondition for civil confinement of the dangerously
insane when no acceptable treatment existed.
Id. at 366 (citations omitted).
95 See id. at 366. The Court added, To conclude otherwise would obligate a State to re-
lease certain confined individuals who were both mentally ill and dangerous simply be-
cause they could not be successfully treated for their afflictions." Id.
" See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366-68.
°5 See id. at 367 (quoting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a07(a)). The Court observed that "as
in Allen, the State has a statutory obligation to provide care and treatment for [persons
adjudged sexually dangerous] designed to effect recovery.'" Id. (quoting Allen, 478 U.S. at
369) (internal quotation marks omitted). In particular, the Court pointed to KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a01, which purported to establish a civil commitment procedure "for the long-
term care and treatment of the sexually violent predator," as well as § 59-29a09, which re-
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"the States enjoy wide latitude in developing treatment regimens." 96
Additionally, the Court held that, even if there were deficiencies in
the State's treatment program, under the unique circumstances of the
case, there was no constitutional violation. 97 The Court reasoned that
the plaintiff "was the first person committed under the Act[,]" and, as
a result, "the State did not have all of its ... procedures in place.""
Because the Kansas statute was recently enacted and because the
record was undeveloped, the Court did not further articulate any guide-
lines for determining whether a treatment program is constitutionally
adequate." Accordingly, the majority's decision in Hendricks leaves the
law much as it existed, and although it is clear that treatment is re-
quired, the specific elements of a constitutionally adequate treatment
program remain uncertain,' 00
The concurring and dissenting opinions in Hendricks likewise pro-
vide little guidance. 101 Justice Kennedy filed a separate concurrence to
note the unique and challenging circumstances presented by diag-
nosed pedophiles. 192 He observed that, as a practical matter, the Kansas
statute may result in an individual's lifelong confinement, given that
current medical knowledge regarding pedophilia is limited and provid-
ing sufficient treatment for pedophiles that would ensure "no serious
danger will come from release of the detainee" is inherently difficult. 163
Justice Kennedy did not find this outcome troubling as long as the
purpose of commitment was not "simply to impose punishment after
the State makes an improvident plea bargain on the criminal side,"
given that "incapacitation is a goal common to both the criminal and
civil systems of confinement." 1" Nonetheless, Justice Kennedy recog-
nized that the implementation of the Kansas statute might become un-
quired confinement to "conform to constitutional requirements for care and treatment."
See id.
96 See id. at 368 n.4 (citing Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 317).
97 See id. at 367-68.
98 Id.
99 Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367-68. The Court suggested that evidence not in the record
would have demonstrated that the State was providing adequate treatment. See id. at 368
n.4. Specifically, the Court noted that, in a hearing regarding the plaintiff's motion for
state habeas corpus relief, the trial court had concluded that adequate treatment was being
provided. See id. at 368 n.5. The dissent, however, noted that reliance on such extra-record
materials would be inappropriate and maintained that, in any event, the majority's conclu-
sion was not warranted. See id. at 391-92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1(1° See id. at 365-69 (majority opinion).
1 ° 1 See id. at 371-97.
102 See id. at 371-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
10 See id. at 372.
104 See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 372-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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constitutional if "civil confinement were to become a mechanism for
retribution or general deterrence, or if it were shown that mental ab-
normality is too imprecise a category to offer a solid basis for conclud-
ing that civil detention is justified." 105
The dissent in Hendricks also failed to specifically describe the ele-
ments of an adequate treatment program.'" Although the dissent
agreed that the plaintiffs commitment was appropriate because he was
"mentally ill" and "dangerous," 107 the dissent found that the plaintiff
was not receiving constitutionally adequate treatment.'" The dissent
disputed the notion that the case involved an "untreatable" detainee.'"
The record, it noted, demonstrated that "pedophilia is an 'abnormality'
or 'illness' that can be treated." 11 ° The dissent, however, argued that the
record supported the Kansas Supreme Court's finding that "as of the
time of [plaintiffs] commitment, the State had not funded treatment,
it had not entered into treatment contracts, and it had little, if any,
qualified treatment staff," which resulted in the plaintiff "receiving 'es-
sentially no treatment. , "iii
Moreover, the dissent suggested that the lack of treatment was
consistent with the intent of Kansas legislators when they enacted the
statute—to warehouse, rather than treat, potentially dangerous sexual
predators.'" Because the dissent believed that the record was devoid
of any evidence of treatment, however, it also did not have occasion to
discuss adequate treatment procedures. 113 Indeed, the only specific
requirement mentioned by the dissent was the statute's failure to pro-
vide for the possibility of using less restrictive alternatives to confine-
ment, such as post-release supervision or halfway houses, which were
required by similar laws in other states.'"
m5 See id. at 373.
106 See id. at 373-96 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
107
	 id. at 375-77.
08 See id. at 394.
1" See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 378 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
In See id. at 378; see also Berliner, supra note 70, at 1209-10 (discussing the range of
expert opinions regarding the question of whether recidivism among child molesters and
rapists can be reduced through treatment").
In See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 384 (Breyer, J., dissenting). The dissent maintained that
the Kansas statute violated the Due Process Clause because when a State decides offend-
ers can be treated and confines an offender to provide that treatment, but then refuses to
provide it, the refusal to treat while a person is fully incapacitated begins to look punitive."
Id. al 390.
112 See id. at 384-86 (discussing the Kansas statute's legislative history and statutory
provisions).
I " See id. at 384.
111 See id. at 387-88.
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C. Seling v. Young: An "As Applied" Challenge to Washington's Civil
Commitment of Sexually Violent Predators
, Finally, in Seling u Young, the Supreme Court resolved an "as ap-
plied" challenge to the State of Washington's Community Protection
Act, which authorizes the civil commitment of "sexually violent preda-
tors." 115 The plaintiff argued that, although the Washington Supreme
Court had held that the statute was civil in nature and thus did not vio-
late due process, the statute, as it was applied in his particular case, was
punitive and therefore "criminal" in nature.n 6 In particular, the plain-
tiff maintained that the conditions at Washington's Special Commit-
ment Center were incompatible with the statute's treatment purpose. 117
The Ninth Circuit held that under Hendricks, the plaintiff could bring
an "as applied" challenge even if the statute was facially valid. 118
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision.'" At the outset, the majority concurred with the Washington
Supreme Court that the statute was facially valid."'" Indeed, the Court
noted that it was "strikingly similar" to the statute at issue in Hendricks,
which also "provided treatment for sexually violent predators: 121 The
Court reiterated that, although "not all mental conditions [are] treat-
able," where conditions are treatable, constitutionally adequate treat-
ment is required. 122 Nonetheless, the majority concluded that plaintiffs
"as applied" challenge was "unworkable," because it "would invite an
end run around the Washington Supreme Court's decision that the Act
is civil in circumstances where a direct attack on that decision is not
before this Court." 123
The Court underscored that its decision did "not mean that re-
spondent and others committed as sexually violent predators have no
remedy for the alleged conditions and treatment regime at the Ceti-
us 531 U.S. at 253 (citing WASII. REV. CODE §§ 71.09.010—.902 (1990)); see also, e.g., Jo-
seph Hough, Seling v. Young: No As Applied" Challenge to Civil Commitment, 28 Am. J. CIttm.
L. 251 (2001); Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan, Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary
Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35 CoriN. L. REv. 319, 328-38 (2003).
" 6 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 259-60.
17 See id. at 260.
" 8 See Young v, Weston, 192 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1999).
119 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 267.
IN See id. at 260.
12 ' See id. at 260-61 ("In fact, Kansas patterned its Act after Washington's.").
122 Id. at 262-63.
122 Id. at 263-64. The Court added that an "as-applied" challenge would, in effect, pre-
clude a final determination concerning whether a statute was "punitive." See id. at 263.
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ter."124 The Court further noted that the statute conferred an express
right to treatment, and there was ongoing litigation regarding the con-
stitutionality of the conditions of confinement at the facility. 126 The
Court also observed that the procedural posture of the case gave it "no
occasion to consider how the civil nature of a confinement scheme re-
lates to other constitutional challenges, such as due process," 126 or to
"consider the extent to which a court may look to actual conditions of
confinement and implementation of the statute to determine in the
first instance whether a confinement scheme is civil in nature." 127
Justice Scalia filed a separate concurrence specifically disputing
that this was an "open question."128 Justice Scalia maintained that "any
consideration of subsequent implementation in the course of making a
'first instance' determination cannot extend to all subsequent imple-
mentation, but must be limited to implementation of confinement, and
of other impositions that are 'not a fixed event." 126
In his separate concurrence, Justice Thomas went even further,
maintaining that "a statute which is civil on its face cannot be divested
of its civil nature simply because of the manner in which it is imple-
mented."'" He wrote that lain implementation-based challenge to a
facially civil statute would be as inappropriate in reviewing the statute in
the 'first instance."'lsl
In contrast, Justice Stevens maintained in his dissent that the con-
ditions of confinement could be considered at any time in order to
124 Seling, 531 U.S. at 265.
I" See id. at 265-66. As the Court observed, the Special Commitment Center was
operat[ing] under an injunction that require[d] it to adopt and implement a
plan for training and hiring competent sex offender therapists; to improve re-
lations between residents and treatment providers; to implement a treatment
program for residents containing elements required by prevailing profes-
sional standards; to develop individual treatment programs; and to provide a
psychologist or psychiatrist expert in the diagnosis and treatment of sex of-
fenders to supervise the staff.
Id. at 266.
' 26 Id. at 266,
127 Id. at 266-67 ("We have not squarely addressed the relevance of conditions of con-
finement to a first instance determination, and that question need not be resolved here.").
128 See id. at 267-70 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129 Seling, 531 U.S. at 268 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Hudson v. United States, 522
U.S. 93 (1997)).
1 " See id. at 270 (Thomas, J., concurring).
"I Id. at 274 ("The Washington Act does not provide on its face for punitive condi-
tions of confinement, and the actual conditions under which the Act is implemented are
of no concern to our inquiry.").
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gain "full knowledge of the effects of the statute." 132 Justice Stevens con-
tended that the Court had "consistently looked to the conditions of
confinement as evidence of both the legislative purpose behind the
statute and its actual effect." 133 Moreover, he contended that this issue
was properly before the Court even though the Washington Supreme
Court had previously decided that the statute was in fact "civil." 154
Thus, despite the concurrences maintaining that the actual condi-
tions of confinement could play only a limited role or no role at all in
assessing the constitutionality of a civil commitment statute,'" a strong
majority of the Court again reaffirmed that, although the plaintiff's "as
applied" challenge failed, the conditions of confinement were properly
considered in assessing the constitutionality of the statute "in the first
instance."136 The Court again affirmed that treatment was a necessary
element to support the constitutionality of civil commitment statutes.
And, again, because of the procedural posture of the case, the Court
did not have the opportunity to fully articulate the elements of a consti-
tutionally adequate treatment program.'"
III. THE FRAMEWORK FOR ASSESSING WHETHER TREATMENT IS
CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE
Because the Supreme Court has failed to articulate the specific
elements of a constitutionally adequate treatment program, the lower
federal courts have been left to fill the gap.'" In particular, the seven-
teen-year litigation over Washington's civil commitment program has
helped establish a framework for assessing the constitutionality of such
programs. 1" That framework includes basic requirements such as: (1)
the right to individualized treatment that provides an avenue to even-
tual release upon successful treatment, (2) rigorous oversight mecha-
152 See id. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 275 (citing Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361, 367-69; Allen, 478 U.S. at 369, 373-74;
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253,269-71 (1984)).
1 m See Seling, 531 U.S. at 277 (Stevens, J., dissenting),
' 35 See id. at 267-74 (concurring and dissenting opinions).
"6 See id. at 256-57 (majority opinion); id. at 267 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 275
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
157 See id. at 265-67 (majority opinion).
130 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250 (2001); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997);
Allen v, Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986); see also Sharp V. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166,1172 (9th Cir.
2000); Turay v. Seling (Nov. 25, 1998 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 11-12 (W.D. Wash.
Nov. 25, 1998).
1" See, e.g., Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172; Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11-12; Turay v. Wes-
ton (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief), No. C91-664WD, slip op,
at 3-7 (W.D. Wash, Feb. 4,1997),
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nisms, and (3) the principles governing judicial oversight. 14° These ba-
sic principles shape the contours of the states' obligations in adminis-
tering treatment programs that balance committed individuals' consti-
tutional rights with protecting the general public."'
Washington's civil commitment statute, like others around the
coun try, 142
 allows the state to indefinitely commit individuals classified
as "sexually violent predators" after they have served or are about to
complete their prison sentences. 143 The statute defines a "sexually vio-
lent predator" as an individual who has been convicted of or charged
with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a mental abnor-
mality or personality disorder which makes the person likely to engage
in predatory acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facil-
ity."'" The state bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable
doubt that an individual is a "sexually violent predator." 145 The statute
specifically recognizes that committed individuals have a right to "ade-
quate care and individualized treatment:146
Under the statute,'a committed person is entitled to an annual ex-
amination of the individual's mental condition. 147 If the examination
indicates that the individual's condition is so changed that he is not
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence, state officials must
authorize the person to petition the court for conditional release and
discharge. 148 In addition, the detainee may independently petition for
discharge from confinement. 149 In determining whether the petition
140 See infra notes 156-198 and accompanying text.
14 ' See infra notes 156-198 and accompanying text.
'42 See, e.g.. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3701 to -3717 (1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§§ 6600-6667 (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 394.910 (West 1998); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT.
207/1 to /99 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (1994); MASS. GEN. Laws. ch. 123A
(2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 2531109 (West 1982); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 632.480—.513 (West
1999); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:427.24 to .38 (West 1999); N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW §§ 10.01-
.17 (McKinney 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 25-03,3-1 to -24 (1997); S.C. Cone ANN. § 44-48
(1998); Thx. HEAuni & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 841 (Vernon 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.2-
900 to -920 (West 2003); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 980 (West 1993).
143
 See WASH. REV. CODE §g 71.09.010—.902.
144 See id, § 71.09.020(16).
145 See id. § 71.09.060(1). If the state does so, the individual may be committed for con-
trol, care, and treatment under the supervision of the Department of Social and Health
Services. See id, The detainee may also independently petition the court for discharge from
confinement. Id. § 71.09.090(2). In evaluating the petition, the court will examine whether
the individual's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that he is no
longer likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence. See id. § 71.09.090(2)(c).
149
	 id. § 71.09.080(2).
147 See id. § 71.09.070.
140 See WASH. REV. CODE § 71.09.090 (1) .
149 Id. § 71.09.090(2).
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will be granted, the central question is whether the individual's mental
abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that he is no longer
likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence.'" Accordingly, the
statute specifically recognizes that committed individuals have a right to
"adequate care and individualized treatment." 151 Courts presiding over
Washington's SCC litigation have recognized that, under well-settled
Supreme Court precedent, the Due Process Clause similarly requires
that states provide civilly-committed individuals access to treatment that
"gives them a realistic opportunity to be cured and released." 152
 This
involves examining whether treatment decisions meet "professionally
accepted minimum standards."'" The courts have noted that
"[b] ecause the purpose of confinement is not punitive, the state must
also provide the civilly-committed [individuals] with 'more considerate
treatment and conditions of confinement than criminals whose condi-
tions of confinement are designed to punish.'" 154 Lower courts, how-
ever, have been left to identify what conditions are sufficiently nonpuni-
tive and also afford residents a "realistic opportunity" to be successfully
treated and released.' 55
A. The Elements of Washington's Individualized Treatment Program
The SCC litigation has done much to flesh out the constitutional
requirements for civil commitment treatment programs. 156 Over the
litigation's seventeen-year history, the courts received input from ex-
perts who provided direction regarding minimally acceptable standards
governing such programs. 157 In the process, the courts articulated a
variety of guidelines, implemented in the Turay Injunction, requiring
the SCC to implement certain treatment procedures in order to pro-
vide residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. 158
150 See id. § 71.09.090.
151 See id. § 71.09.080.
1" Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172 (citing Ohlinger v. Watson, 652 F.2d 775, 778 (9th Cir.
1980)).
155 Soc'y for Good Will to Retarded Children, Inc. v. Cuomo, 737 F.2d 1239, 1248 (2d
Cir. 1984).
154 See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172 (quoting Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321-22
(1982)).
155 See, e.g., id. (citing Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 778); Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11-12.
156 	e.g, Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170-72 (citing Ohlinger, 652 F.2d at 778); Nov. 25, 1998 Or-
der, slip op. at 11-12; Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief, slip op. at 3.
157 See, e.g., Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11-16 (discussing the generally accepted
therapy components the SCC was not providing).
156 See Turay v. Weston (Turay Injunction), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 4-5 (W.D. Wash.
June 6, 1994).
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A cornerstone of a constitutionally adequate civil commitment
treatment program is individualized treatment) 59 In the SCC litigation,
the district court repeatedly underscored the necessity of an individual-
ized approach to treatment. 36° As the court observed, "[Ondividualized
treatment plans are critical and should provide for systematic measure-
ments of the individual's progress." 16I The court added that a successful
treatment program should demonstrate "the way to improvement and
release" and contain "the components recognized as necessary for
maximum treatment potential. "162
Quality interaction between residents and staff is also important in
constructing a constitutionally adequate treatment program. 163 In the
SCC litigation, the courts addressed a range of allegations regarding
staff abuse of residents, as well as the generally poor interaction be-
tween staff and residents, which undermined successful treatment)"
Accordingly, the Turay Injunction required the SCC to not only prevent
staff abuse, but also "required [the] SCC to take steps to rectify the lack
of trust between the residents and staff." 165 The Ninth Circuit held that
such a requirement is necessary to avoid "severely hampering effective
treatmen t. "166
The court also found that the SCC lacked "adequate grievance
procedures and behavior management plans," which constitute an-
other "generally accepted component of effective treatment pro-
grams."167
 The district court in the SCC litigation found that "[a]ll par-
ties recognize that the prompt and fair handling of grievances is an
159 See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11-12; Turay Injunction,
slip op. at 5.
160 See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11-12; Turay Injunction,
slip op. at 5. The individualized treatment requirement was derived from standards set
forth by the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers. See Nou 25, 1998 Order, slip
op, at 11-12.
161 See Nou 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11-12 (quoting standards issued by the Associa-
tion for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers); see also Turay v. Seling (Feb. 27, 2003 Order), No.
C91-664R, slip op. at 22 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 27, 2003) (ordering the SCC to "[c]orrect the
long-standing deficiencies in the treatment program").
"62 See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1169 n.2; Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 12.
10 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; Turay Injunction, slip op. at 5-4.
164 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; Turay Injunction, slip op. at 3-4.
166 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; Turay Injunction, slip op. at 4.
166 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1170; see also Hydrick v. Hunter, 500 F.3d 978,997 (9th Cir. 2007)
(observing that plaintiffs have a "clearly established" right to be free from "conditions that
amount to punishment"); Turay v. Seling (Nou 15, 1999 Order), No. C91 -664WD, slip op. at
3,8 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 19, 1999); Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 8; Order Granting Plaintiffs'
Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief; slip op. at 4 (discussing required staff behavior).
167 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171.
2008]	 The Constitutionality of Civil Commitment 	 1403
essential part of the treatment environment."168 Historically, however,
the grievance system at the SCC had been "ineffective and failed to re-
sult in individualized responses." 169 These deficiencies led to "a general
mistrust of the grievance system among residents."'"
Next, the district court found that the involvement of residents'
family members is an essential element of a constitutionally adequate
treatment program."' When it was created, the SCC program imposed
significant barriers to the participation of family members in treat-
ment. 172 The district court directed the SCC to remove those barriers,
finding that family participation was another important aspect of suc-
cessful treatment.'"
Finally, an essential element of the Turay Injunction required the
SCC to establish a less restrictive alternative ("LRA") program that
placed residents on a path toward eventual release. 174 Indeed, the dis-
trict court observed:
[T]his phase [of the treatment program] is required by stat-
ute, and confirmed by all experts on both sides as a vital part
of the professional minimum standards. Without LRAs, the
constitutional requirement of treatment leading, if successful,
to cure and release, cannot fully be met. This area is described
by the special master as "the most important piece of unfin-
ished business in the SCC program."'"
Ian Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1157 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
169 Turay v. Seling (Apr: 17, 2002 Order), No. C91-664R, slip op. at 24 (W.D. Wash. Apr.
17, 2002).
"0 Feb. 27, 2003 Order, slip op. at 13.
1171 See Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
1172 See id.; Turay Injunction, slip op. at 5.
"3 See Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
"4 See id.; Nov. 15, 1998 Order, slip op. at 9.
Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 (internal citation omitted). The district court noted
that "[w] ithout that component, a commitment to the SCC or any similar institution would
be exactly what the Constitution forbids: a life sentence to be served in a prison masquer-
ading as a treatment facility." Turay v. Seling (Dec. 20, 2000 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip
op. at 12 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 20, 2000); see also Turay v. Seling (Order Amending Feb. 2003
Findings of Fact), No. C91-664R, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2003) (describing hOw
minimum professional treatment standards, which include community transition for quali-
fied residents, define the scope of the constitutional right to treatment). As the dissent in
Kansas v. Hendricks observed, the LRA component was dictated by a long line of Supreme
Court precedent that required consideration of "'alternative and less harsh methods' to
achieve a nonpunitive objective." See 521 U.S. 344, 388 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539 n.20 (1979)).
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Accordingly, the district court emphasized the need for development of
constitutionally and statutorily required LRAs, 176
 and, as in other areas
of injunction compliance, emphasized that it must monitor the SCC's
progress to ensure program changes were effectively implemented.'"
B. Constitutionally Adequate Oversight
The district court found that adequate oversight mechanisms were
critical to ensuring the provision of constitutionally adequate treatment
to SCC residents. 178 Indeed, a key finding supporting the Turay Injunc-
tion was that "the SCC program lacked sufficient oversight," During
the course of the proceedings, the court developed several potential
oversight inechanisms. 18° First, the Inspection of Care Committee (the
"IOCC"), a panel of independent experts familiar with the treatment of
sexually violent predators, conducted annual inspections and issued re-
ports regarding the SCC's treatment program. 181 Second, the court ap-
pointed an ombudsman to observe staff-resident relations at the SCC,
respond to complaints, and assist in the resolution of complaints be-
cause "residents' complaints of mistreatment by staff have proliferated
to a point that jeopardizes the defendants' ability to provide constitu-
tionally adequate mental health treatment as required by the injunc-
tion."182 Finally, a resident advisory council was appointed and tasked
with being "fully informed and consulted about important projects."m
176 See Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1156.
177 See, e.g., Feb. 27, 2003 Order, slip op. at 20. The court added, "Court oversight con-
tinues to be essential to ensure the defendants ... correct the ongoing deficiencies in the
treatment program so as to provide SCC residents with a discernable path toward release."
Id.
178 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171.
179 See id.; see also Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 14; Nou 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 11;
Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief, slip op. at 5.
leo See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171; Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1157-58 (discussing the SCC's
failure to comply with oversight mechanisms); Turay v. Richards (Order Granting Motion to
Dissolve Injunction), No. C91-0664RSM,-. 2007 WI, 983132, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007)
(discussing oversight by the IOCC).
181 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4; STATE OF
WASHINGTON, DEPT. OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., INSPECTION OF CARE COMMIT
TEE REPORT 1 (Feb. 11, 2005) [hereinafter Feb. 11, 2005 IOCC REPORT] (identifying IOCC
members).
182 See Turay v. Weston (Order on Turay's Motion for Further Injunctive Relief), No. C91—
664WD, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 1995) (discussing the appointment and duties
of the ombudsman).
la9 See Turay, 108 F. Supp. 2d at 1158.
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These additional oversight mechanisms supplemented the oversight
provided by the district court and the court-appointed special master. 184
C. Principles Governing Judicial Oversight
The courts have also formulated guidelines for judicial oversight
of treatment programs. 189 For example, the Ninth Circuit made clear
that, in evaluating the constitutionality of civil commitment treatment
programs, the courts may not simply "defer to the professional judg-
ment of the ... superintendent and clinical director."188 Rather, they
must "look[] beyond the ... administrators' assertions of compliance"
in order to determine whether the state has "fulfilled the require-
ments" under the Constitution and the court's injunction.' 87
Indeed, in affirming the Turay Injunction, the Ninth Circuit re-
peatedly rejected the SCC's "principal contention" that courts must
"defer to the professional judgment of the SCC superintendent and
clinical director."188 As the court observed, "[A] ccepting such an ar-
gument would transfer the safeguarding of constitutional rights from
the' courts to mental health professionals. Conditions of confinement
would be above judicial scrutiny and would depend on who happened
to be in charge of a particular program:189 In evaluating Washing-
ton's program, the Ninth' Circuit held that SCC administrators had
"made decisions about the program that [fall] well below professional
standards for treatment of sexual offenders, or that [are] not entitled
to deference because they were not made in the [SCC's'] professional
judgment. "190
The district court also emphasized that it would continue to review
the SCC's compliance with the terms of the Turay Injunction in order
to ensure that there was no "backsliding. "191 This monitoring was criti-
184 See, e.g., id. at 1157-58 (evaluating the SCC's compliance with previous court orders
to improve its treatment programs and facilities). The court-appointed special master pre-
pared a series of reports for the court detailing the SCC's progress in complying with the
terms of the Turay Injunction. See id. at 1152.
185 See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171-72.
188 See id. at 1171.
187 Id. at 1172.
188 See id. at 1171-72, 1174,
189 Id. at 1171.
119° See Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1172.
191 See, e.g., Turay v. Seling (Apr. 14, 2005 Order), No. C91-664RSM, slip op. at 4 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 14, 2005); Turay v. Seling (June 10, 2004 Order), No. C91-0604L, slip op. at 10
(W.D. Wash. June 10, 2004); Feb. 27, 2003 Order, slip op. at 3; Turay v. Seling (Apt 17, 2002
Order), No. C91-664R, slip op. at 4 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2002); Turay v. Seling (Aug. 14,
2001 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 8 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 14, 2001); Dec. 20, 2000 Order,
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cal in ensuring the SCC's continued compliartce. 192 Without continuing
judicial oversight, the SCC would lack an incentive to maintain the
gains that had been achieved through court supervision. 193
When the Ninth Circuit reviewed the SCC's request to dissolve the
Turay Injunction, the court observed, "A history of noncompliance
with prior orders can justify greater court involvement than is ordinar-
ily permitted." 194 In order to demonstrate that an injunction should be
dissolved, defendants must demonstrate that constitutional require-
ments are being met and that defendants are unlikely to "return to
[their] former ways:195 These concerns applied in the SCC litigation,
where the district court concluded that residents had a "valid concern
that without judicial oversight, the SCC and its treatment program will
eventually revert back to the very structure that gave rise to this lawsuit
in the first place." 196 As the district court observed, the issues in the case
were "serious" and the appropriate solutions "appeared difficult at
best."'" Accordingly, judicial supervision was "essential" given the
SCC's recalcitrance and repeated failure to comply with its constitu-
tional obligations.'"
slip op. at 13. The court also noted it would oversee the SCC regarding elements of the
Turay Injunction that had been dissolved. See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunc-
tion, 2007 WI.. 983132, at *2-3 (evaluating whether the SCC had engaged in prohibited
'backsliding" regarding any component of the treatment program).
192 See Via", 233 F.3d at 1172.
193 See id
191 Id. at 1173; see also Grubbs v. Bradley, 821 F. Supp. 496, 503 {M.D. Tenn. 1993)
("Compliance with previous court orders, as well as good faith efforts by defendants, are
obviously relevant in deciding whether to modify or dissolve a federal court remedial de-
cree." (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-99 (1991))); Gluth v. Kangas, 773 F.
Supp. 1309, 1316 (D. Ariz. 1988) ("[T] he Court recognizeisi that future personnel
changes are inevitable and departures from present practices are possible. Thus, at the
very least, to prevent the Department from slipping back into its old practices, an in-
junction is necessary—with relief available by petition to the Court if future backsliding
occurs."). •
199 Dowell, 998 U.S. at 247-49. 	 •
196 Turay v. Richards (July 26, 2006 Order on Scope of Hearing), No. C91-0664RSM, slip
op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. July 26, 2006).
191 Sept. 18, 2006 Transcript, supra note 42, at 33-34.
198 See, e.g., Feb. 27, 2003 Order, slip op. at 20; Dec. 20, 2000 Order, slip op. at 13; Nov. 15,
1999 Order, slip op. at 20. Indeed, the district court was emphatic on this point:
The Court acknowledges plaintiffs' valid concern that without judicial over-
sight, the SCC and its treatment program will eventually revert back to the
very structure that gave rise to this lawsuit in the first place, The Court recog-
nizes that, historically, remedial action has not occurred at the SCC until de-
fendants have been faced with an imminent status hearing before this Court.
The Court, too, is concerned that without judicial oversight, the efforts made
by all parties to date may be undone.
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IV. THE SCC's NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ITS CONSTITUTIONAL
OBLIGATIONS
Although the courts presiding over the SCC litigation have devel-
oped specific and well-defined criteria for assessing whether a civil com-
mitment treatment program meets constitutional requirements, compli-
ance with these requirements has been illusive. 199 Indeed, a string of
judicial decisions have documented the SCC's long history of failing to
provide constitutionally adequate treatment for residents. 200 The Ninth
Circuit has highlighted "the state's repeated and documented failures to
rectify the constitutional shortcomings of its civil commitment facilities
for sex offenders,"20 and in particular, the SCC's "history of noncompli-
ance with the Turay Injunction."202 Nonetheless, in 2007, the district
court granted the SCC's request to dissolve the Turay Injunction, despite
the SCC's "backsliding" with respect to its compliance with constitutional
requirements. 2°3
A. The SCC's Repeated Requests to Dissolve the Turay Injunction
Despite Its Noncompliance
From the outset of the litigation in 1994, the SCC failed to comply
with the district court's orders to improve its treatment program. 204
July 26, 2006 Order on Scope of Hearing, slip op. at 2.
199 See, e.g„ Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2000); Turay v. Seling
(Nov. 15, 1999 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 6-18 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1999); Turay
Seling (Nov. 25, 1998 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 10-15 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25,
1998); Turay v. Weston (Turay Injunction), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 4-5 (W.D. Wash.
June 6, 1994).
"° See, e.g., Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1171-72; Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18; Nou 25,
1998 Order, slip op. at 10-15; Turay Injunction, slip op. at 4-5.
"' Cunningham v. David Special Commitment Ctr., 56 Fed. App'x 393, 394 (9th Cir.
2003).
202 Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1173.
203 Turay v. Richards (Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction), No. C91-0664RSM,
2007 WL 983132, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007).
2" See, e.g., Sharp, 233 F.3d at 1173; Nov. 25, 1998 Order; slip op. at 7-10; Turay v. Wes-
ton (First Supplemental Order Regarding Injunction), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 1-3 (W.D.
Wash. Aug. 22, 1994), The constitutional shortcomings of Washington's civil commitment
treatment program periodically have been the subject of academic commentary. See, e.g.,
Jennifer M. Connor, Seling v. Young: Constitutionally Protected but Unjust Civil Commitment for
Sexually Violent Predators, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoCv 511, 525-26 (2002) ("The
SCC has ... taken no action to comply with constitutionally required and statutorily man-
dated conditions, including much needed mental health treatment"); John Kip Cornwell,
The Right to Community Treatment for Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders, 34 SurcoN HALL L. Km
1213, 1215 (2004) (describing the district court's finding that the SCC has -failled) to
provide constitutionally adequate treatment"); Janus & Logan, supra note 115, at 374 (writ-
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Shortly after the district court issued the Turay Injunction, the court
held that the SCC had failed to present a sufficient plan for compli-
ance. 2°9
 As a result, the court entered a supplemental order that clari-
fied the terms of the injunction and appointed a special master to over-
see the SCC's compliance. 2°6
Over a year later, the SCC still had not complied with the terms of
the injunction, and residents moved for contempt sanctions and fur-
ther injunctive relief. 207
 Although the district court denied the request
for contempt sanctions, it granted an unopposed portion of the motion
seeking the appointment of a full-time ombudsman to internally review
the SCC's progress. 208 The court added that "the motion raises serious
issues" since the SCC "still [has] not complied adequately" with the
court's rulings."9
On March 6, 1996, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the
residents' renewed request for contempt sanctions as well as the SCC's
motion for release from the Turay Injunction. 210 The court denied the
SCC's release request, finding that "more remains to be done to achieve
full compliance,"211 and that the "[SCC] must work diligently with the
Special Master to achieve full compliance with the injunction. "212
ing that "conditions and treatment in the SVP program fell below constitutional stan-
dards"); John Q. La Fond, Can Therapeutic Jurisprudence Be Normatively Neutral! Sexual Preda-
tor Laws: Their Impact on Participants and Policy, 41 Atoz. L. REV, 375, 388 (1999) ("The
treatment environment at [the} SCC has severely hampered any attempt to meet constitu-
tional standards." (quoting Nou 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 13)).
26° Set First Supplemental Order Regarding Injunction, slip op. at 1-3.
2°6 See Turay v. Weston ( Order Appointing Special Master), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 1-2
(W.D. Wash. Sept. 22, 1994).
2°7 See Turay v. Weston (Order on Turay's Motion for Further Injunctive Relief), No. C91-
664WD, slip op. at 1-2 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 21, 1995).
208 See id. at 2-3.
" See id. at 3.
510 See Turay v. Weston (Order on Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Injunctive Relief and Con-
tempt and Defendants' Motion for Release front Injunction), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 1 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 2, 1996).
stn
	 id. at 2-4.
212 Id. at 3. After holding another evidentiary hearing and visiting the SCC, the district
court entered an order on February 4, 1997, that again denied the SCC's motion to dis-
solve the injunction. Turay v. Weston (Order Granting Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion far Injunctive
Relief), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 3-7 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 4, 1997). The court found that
"compliance with the injunction is still not complete" because the SCC was not providing
residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. Id. at 6. For example, the court noted
that the SCC had failed to establish a community transition component, had not ade-
quately integrated family members into the treatment program, and had not provided "a
structure for objective, external oversight." Id. at 4-5.
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After additional evidentiary hearings, the district court entered
another order on October 1, 1997, finding that the "[SCC] [has] not
yet achieved full compliance with the injunction" and that "[t]tle cen-
tral need is to translate into reality a program that exists on paper." 2"
The court observed that "[w] hat is required is not just a plan but a real-
ity—the genuine providing of adequate mental health treatment to all
SCC residents willing to accept it." 214 The court held that such a fully
operational program must include the following components, which
were lacking:
[T]hat the staff members understand the treatment model
and their roles within it; that the delivery of services be effec-
tive and consistent across treatment teams; that residents know
what they must do to move toward release and where they are
in the treatment process; that there be ongoing monitoring of
the treatment process; that measures of progress be correlated
to the goals of treatment; that the residents know the program
policies; that policy enforcement be consistent; that the resi-
dents be treated with respect; and that the program be able to
deal with the long-term needs of those not engaged in treat-
ment.215
On March 30, 1998, the court entered an order finding that the
SCC had improperly attempted to curtail the court-appointed om-
budsman's authority to conduct investigations. 216 The court directed
the SCC "to refrain from any further attempts to alter court-ordered
requirements without obtaining court approval." 217
After another evidentiary hearing and site visit, on November 25,
1998, the court held that the "defendants have not yet made constitu-
tionally adequate mental health treatment available to the plaintiffs." 218
The court found that "Mile necessity of keeping the injunction in
force has been confirmed by every independent expert who testified or
whose opinion otherwise appears in the record, including defendants'
213 Turay v. Seling (Order Denying Plaintiffs' Renewed Motion for Contempt), No. C91-
664WD, slip op. at 3-4 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 1, 1997).
2" See id. at 4.
213 Id. at 4-5.
216 Turay v. Seling (Order on Plaintiffs' Motion Re: Authority of Ombudsman), No. C91-
664WD, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 30, 1998).
217 See id. at 3. The court's approval would formally modify the previously stipulated
and ordered definition of the ombudsman's responsibilities. See id. at 2-3.
818 Nov. 25, 1998 Order, slip op. at 4, 11.
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expert."219 The court cited several deficiencies in the SCC's compli-
ance, including "a need for additional staff training," the lack of a "co-
herent and individualized treatment plan for each resident," "inade-
quate provision at SCC for participation by residents' families in their
rehabilitation," and the lack of "[flair and reasonable grievance proce-
dures and behavior management plans. "220
In affirming Judge Dwyer's November 1998 order, the Ninth Cir-
cuit agreed that "the district court correctly concluded that the [SCC]
had made decisions about the program that fell well below professional
standards for treatment of sexual offenders," and that there were "nu-
merous inadequacies" in the SCC's treatment program. 22 i As the court
observed, "At the time of the 1998 hearing (and at a number of hear-
ings in between the 1994 and 1998 orders), the district court found
that few, if any, of its initial requirements had been satisfied and that in
some instances progress had actually been set back .. "222
B. The SCC's Citation for Contempt of Court
In 1999, the district court held additional hearings and once again
found that the SCC "intentionally disregarded the injunction's re-
quirements."223 The court held that the SCC "persistently [has] failed
to make constitutionally adequate mental health treatment available to
the SCC residents, and [has] departed so substantially from profes-
sional minimum standards as to demonstrate that their decisions and
practices were not and are not based on their professional judg-
ment."224 Finally, the court found that the State had treated the SCC "as
an unwanted stepchild" for whom it "failed to devote the resources
necessary to achieve compliance." 225
In its ruling, the court relied upon a report issued by the
IOCC.226 The report "made findings of deficiencies similar to those
found by the court and the special master" and highlighted "a further
serious concern, that of inadequate medical staff and facilities for the
21° Id.
22° Id. at 12,14.
"1 See Shall), 233 F.3d at 1172.
2 Id. at 1173.
343 Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 4-5,18. The court specifically noted the SCC's "foot-
dragging which has continued for an unconscionable time." Id.
224 Id. at 19.
225 Id. at 15-16. The court also found there were still inadequacies in *staffing, staff
training, treatment plans and programs, and treatment environment at the SCC." Id. at 3.
"° See id. at 6-7.
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SCC residents."227 These failings were so apparent that the SCC "did
not contend that injunction compliance has been achieved, and did
•not seek dissolution of the injunction."228 The court added, "Instead,
[the SCC] recognized through the testimony of managerial employees,
and through counsel, that minimum professional standards for,treating
sex offenders are not fully met and that the goal of providing constitu-
tionally adequate mental health treatment is still unattained." 229
The district court also found that the SCC had "fallen into a pat-
tern of first denying that anything is amiss at [the] SCC, then engaging
in a flurry of activity to make improvements before the next court hear-
ing, then admitting at the hearing that shortfalls of constitutional mag-
nitude still exist, then returning to denial."2" The court concluded that
this "entrenched resistance has impeded prompt and wholehearted
compliance with court orders protecting basic liberties." 291 As a result,
the court held the SCC in contempt for its willful failure to comply with
the court's prior orders, finding that sanctions were "essential" to ob-
tain the SCC's compliance. 232
As a result of the SCC's continued noncompliance, these sanctions
remained in place and continued to accrue for several years. 2" In May
2000, Judge Dwyer issued additional findings after conducting another
evidentiary hearing.294 Judge Dwyer reiterated that the SCC had "failed
to make constitutionally adequate mental health treatment available to
the SCC residents, and [had] departed so substantially from profes-
sional minimum standards as to demonstrate that their decisions and
practices were not and are not based on their professional judg-
ment."2" The court found that "[s]hortfalls continue to exist in every
area as the result of earlier failures to take the necessary steps.'"296 Ac-
227 Id.
223 Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 4.
229 Id. at 4-5.
23° Id. at 16.
221 Id.
232 Id. at 20-21. The court ruled the sanctions would accrue in the amount of ap-
proximately $5,000 per day ($50 per day, per resident) and should be paid to the registry
of the court for subsequent disbursement. Id. at 21.
233 See it notes 234-250 and accompanying text.
234 See Turay v. Seling (May 5, 2000 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 3 (W.D. Wash.
May 5, 2000).
233 See id. at17 .
233 Id. at 16. The court further observed that "all parties recognize that injunction
compliance is not yet complete." Id. at 10.
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cordingly, Judge Dwyer denied the SCC's request to dissolve the Turay
Injunction and lift the contempt sanctions. 257
After another site visit and evidentiary hearing, on December 20,
2000, the district court found that several respects injunction
compliance is still incomplete." 239
 The SCC still had not made "consti-
tutionally adequate mental health treatment available to the SCC resi-
dents."239
 As a result, Judge Dwyer refused to "dissolv[e] the injunction
or drop[] the sanction at this point. "240
Because of the SCC's continuing noncompliance, in its August 24,
2001, order, the district court again denied the state's request to lift the
contempt sanctions. 241 As Judge Dwyer observed; multiple courts and
independent observers had concluded that the SCC continued to fail
in its duty to provide constitutionally adequate treatment, 242 The court
noted,
The finding that the SCC has failed to provide such treatment
in the past has been made not just by the jury and the district
judge in the present cases, but also by the State of Washing-
ton's Inspection of Care ("IOC") Reports, by the Superior
Court of the State of Washington for King County, by the spe-
cial master herein, by other experts including one called by
[the] defendants at an earlier hearing, and even by the SCC's
former clinical director and current superintendent. 243
After Judge Dwyer's death, his replacement, Judge Rothstein, also
found that the SCC failed to provide constitutionally adequate treat-
ment and that "injunction compliance remains incomplete."244 Like
Judge Dwyer, she found that each impending hearing caused "a flurry
of activity occurring in the weeks—or days—prior to the hearing" in
order to create the appearance of compliance, but each time, the SCC
failed to comply with the district court's orders. 245 In addition, Judge
. 20, 2000 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 4, 8 (W.D. Wash.
. 14, 2001 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 8, 10 (W.D. Wash.
17, 2002 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 9-10 (W.A. Wash.
237 See id. at 19.
238 Turay v. Seling (Dec
Dec. 20, 2000).
22° Id. at 14.
24° Id. at 16.
241 Turay v. Seling (Aug
Aug. 14, 2001).
242 See id . at 5 .
243 Id.
244
 Turay v. Seling (Apr.
Apr. 17, 2002).
444 See id.; Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 16.
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Rothstein "caution tedi [the] [SCC] against interfering with the inde-
pendence of external oversight mechanisms,"246
 after the SCC inter-
vened in the IOCC review by attempting to add a new member to the
committee, which left the IOC committee "constricted and to some ex- .
tent usurped."247
After additional evidentiary hearings, on February 27, 2003, Judge
Rothstein found that "injunction compliance remains incomplete" and
that "[flitch failure demonstrates the need to continue the contempt
sanctions issued in November 1999."248 The district court also found
that the SCC had engaged in prohibited "backsliding." 249 As a result,
the court held that "[clourt oversight continues to be essential to en-
sure that [the SCC] correct[sl the ongoing deficiencies in the
treatment program so as to provide SCC residents with a discernible
path toward release."25°
C. The District Court's Order Purging the Accrued Contempt Sanctions
Judge Rothstein became Director of the Federal Judicial Center in
2003, and, as a result, the case was reassigned to Judge Robert Lasnik
on an interim basis. 2" Judge Lasnik abruptly purged the contempt
finding and dissolved several components of the Turay Injunction 252—
components the court had previously found were "essential" in "stimu-
lating [the SCC's] compliance."253 Nonetheless, recognizing the SCC's
history of noncompliance, Judge Lasnik conditioned his dissolution on
the requirement that there be "no significant `backsliding.'" 254 More-
over, he refused to dissolve the injunction in its entirety, holding that:
248 Apr. 17, 2002 Order, slip op. at 24.
247 Id. (internal quotations omitted).
248 Turay v. Seling (Feb. 27, 2003 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 4-5, 20 (W.D.
Wash. Feb. 27, 2003).
249 See id. at 17. The court noted that "the IOC [had] concluded that 'the quality of
treatment plans has actually decreased since the last visit. —
 Id.
259 Id. at 20.
251 See Turay v. Seling (June 10, 2004 Order), No. C91-0664L, slip op. at 2-3 (W.D. Wash.
June 10, 2004) (noting the case's previous presiding judges); Press Release, Federal judi-
cial Center, Judge Barbara Rothstein Selected to Head Federal Judicial Center (Mar.
2003), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/mar03ttb/judge.html.
252 See June 10, 2004 Order, slip op. at 9-10.
255 See Dec. 20, 2000 Order, slip op. at 13; Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 20-21; see also
Feb. 27, 2003 Order, slip op. at 5 (finding that "improvements [the SCC has] made come, in
no small part, in response to the court's contempt orders and to the accrual of sanctions");
Apt 17, 2002 Order, slip op. at 9 (finding that any "improvements occurred in direct re-
sponse to the court's contempt orders and to the accrual of sanctions").
"4 See June 10, 2004 Order, slip op. at 10.
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Judicial oversight remains necessary to ensure that [the SCC]
develop [s] and fund [s] off-island LRAs in a timely manner and
with enough capacity to ensure that the treatment [the] SCC
provides is constitutionally adequate. The Court will also moni-
tor how the LRA protocol is administered over time to deter-
mine if the Department of Corrections unduly interferes with
the professional judgment of SCC staff regarding treatment. 255
A few weeks after Judge Lasnik entered his order, the case was reas-
signed to Judge Ricardo Martinez. 256
D. The SCC's Most Recent "Backsliding" and Continued Failure to Provide
Constitutionally Adequate Treatment
After the threat of accruing contempt sanctions was removed, the
SCC's compliance with the Turay Injunction's requirements again
waned. 257 Specifically, in 2005 and 2006, the IOCC issued detailed re-
ports listing several ongoing deficiencies in the SCC's treatment pro-
gram, and the former special master, Dr. Marques, submitted a declara-
tion urging the court to continue judicial oversight of the SCC. 258
1. The 2005 IOCC Report
In February 2005, the IOCC issued a report finding that there
"continue[d] to be concerns regarding many of the same areas cited
before," including "continuing difficulty meeting standards regarding
the provision of medical/psychiatric care, failure to adequately include
nursing staff in treatment planning, lack of consistent progress docu-
mentation and division between clinical and residential staff." 259 The
report observed, among other things, that "[m]edical goals are still very
limited or absent altogether" from the treatment plan 26° and "[a] physi-
235 Id. at 3, 10.
256
 Turay v. Seling (Reassignment Order), No. C91-664RSM (W.D. Wash. July 6, 2004).
257 See infra notes 259-322 and accompanying text.
2" See infra notes 259-322 and accompanying text.
259 See Feb. 11, 2005 IOCC REPORT, supra note 181, at 2. The members of the IOCC
that issued the 2005 and 2006 reports were Robert Briody, the former Executive Director
of the Florida Civil Commitment Center; Irene Lund, former Public Health Advisor to the
State of Washington Department of Social and Health Services ("DSHS"); Nadine Porter,
former Institutional Nurse Consultant to the State of Washington DSHS; and Maureen
Saylor, Certified Sex Offender Treatment Provider. Id. at 1; STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPT.
OF SOCIAL & HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., INSPECTION OF CARE COMMITTEE REPORT, IOCC
FINAL RESPONSE 1 (Jan. 31, 2006) [hereinafter Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT].
260 Feb. 11, 2005 IOCC REPORT, supra note 181, at 18.
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clan medical director is needed." 261 Additionally, "a significant number
[of residents] complained about not knowing what they had to do to
advance in levels and phases" in the treatment program. 262 Finally, the
report observed that there were still problems with the SCC's grievance
system, noting that "not all residents are treated uniformly."268
IOCC members further remarked that the SCC had significantly
interfered with its oversight of the treatment program. 2M Prior to the
IOCC's survey, Dr. Dorcas Dobie, one of the founding members of the
IOCC, resigned after she concluded that SCC management was not ad-
dressing problems identified by the Conunittee. 266 In her resignation
letter, Dr. Dobie cited the SCC's "adversarial" approach that "dispute [s]
the validity of [the IOCC's] findings rather than [resolves] the identi-
fied problems."266 Similarly, Maureen Saylor, another member of the
IOCC, observed that because the "SCC pays for [the] IOCC to do its
work," the "SCC tends to want to be in charge of how the survey does
its work" and "had shown a definite move to directly control what and
how the committee does [its] work." 267 After the resignations, the SCC
appointed two members to the IOCC—both former Washington De-
partment of Safety and Health Services ("DSHS") employees—without
consulting the two remaining IOCC members. 268 The SCC also an-
nounced new "standards" governing the IOCC's work. 269 The IOCC
noted that these actions sought to "directly control what and how the
committee does it's [sic] work."2" In addition, the IOCC noted prob-
lems with the court-appointed ombudsman's ability to engage in over-
sight and observed that the "ombudsperson identified problems in ob-
261 Id. at 51,
262 Id. at 14.
263 Id. at 15, 29.
264 See, e.g., Letter from Dorcas Dobie, IOCC Member, to Mark Seling 1 (Aug. 21,
2003) (on file with author) (discussing the adversarial relationship between the IOCC and
the SCC).
265 See id.
266 See id.; Transcript of Record at 25, 27, Sharp v. Riveland, No. C94-121RSM (W.D.
Wash. Oct. 21, 2004).
262 Letter from Maureen Saylor, IOCC Member, to SCC Management 3 (Feb. 11, 2005)
(alternation in original) (on file with author).
266 Id. at 2.
260 Feb. 11, 2005 IOCC REPORT, supra note 181, at 53-54; Letter from Robert Briody,
IOCC Member, to Henry Richards, SCC Superintendent 4 (Feb. 11, 2005) (on file with
author).
2713 Letter from Maureen Saylor to SCC Management, supra note 267, at 3.
1416	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 49:1383
tabling documentation [from the SCC] necessary for her to fulfill her
assigned responsibilities. "271
This was not the first time that the SCC had interfered with over-
sight mechanisms. 272 The SCC had repeatedly attempted to silence
court-appointed ombudsmen who were critical of the treatment condi-
ticins at the SCC. 275 For example, after the SCC unilaterally terminated
the court-appointed ombudsman, the district court was forced to issue
an order on February 11, 1997, directing that the SCC not take such
unilateral action without a court order. 274 In March 1998, after the SCC
ordered the ombudsman to cease an investigation of an incident at the
SCC, the district court again directed the SCC to refrain from interfer-
ing with the ombudsman, holding that the SCC's "attempt to curtail
[the ombudsman's] authority ... cannot be allowed to stand." 275 And,
in September 1999, the SCC filed a motion to remove the ombudsman,
which the court promptly denied. 276
2. The January 2006 IOCC Report
The IOCC documented further departures from minimally ac-
ceptable standards of professional care in its January 2006 submis-
sion. 277 It reported that Islince 1999 the IOCC has identified a pleth-
ora of serious problems at [the] SCC; many of which have existed for
some time and continue to exist."278 The report concluded that "there
are several areas of concern regarding program functioning," and al-
though "the major areas have been addressed and readdressed, sugges-
tions offered, plans proposed and implemented ....still the problems
have persisted."279
As Dr. Robert Briody, a senior member of the IOCC, stated in a
declaration submitted to the district court, "[t] he IOC Team's conclu-
271 Feb. 11, 2005 IOCC REPORT, supra note 181, at 55. The report noted that the om-
budsperson had encountered resistance while trying to make necessary inquiries. Id.
272 see. e.g., Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 15 (documenting the SCC's attempts to re-
place the current ombudsman); Order on Plaintiffs' Motion Re: Authority of Ombudsman, slip
op. at 2 (discussing the SCC's attempts to curtail the ombudsman's authority).
273 See, e.g., Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 15 (documenting the SCC's attempts to re-
place the ombudsman); Order on Plaintiffs' Motion Re: Authority of Ombudsman, slip op. at 2
(discussing the SCC's attempts to curtail the ombudsman's authority).
274 Turay y. Seling (Feb. 11, 1997 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 1 (W.D. Wash.
Feb, 11, 1997),
270 Order on Plaintiffs' Motion Re: Authority of Ombudsman, slip op. at 2.
2" Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 15.
277 SeeJan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 1.
278 See id. at 33.
279 Id. at1.
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sions go to the very heart of providing adequately and constitutionally
required care for residents at the SCC."280 Dr. Briody observed that al-
though "SCC management has acknowledged many of the problems
identified by the IOCC, ... no real change has occurred."281 Moreover,
because these problems were "so persistent," Dr. Briody concluded that
"improvement will not occur without external oversight and some form
of continued enforcement to require compliance with the oversight
body."282 Indeed, the IOCC report documented numerous deficiencies
in the SCC's treatment program. 288
First, the IOCC found that ineffective management and supervision
hampered the SCC's treatment program and its ability to respond to the
problems previously identified by the district court and the IOCC. 284
Moreover, the report concluded that there were "pervasive problems in
management at the SCC"285 and that "[s]upervisors at the SCC simply
don't actively supervise line staff."288 Moreover, "SCC administration
does not grasp the extent of its own management problems."287
Second, the IOCC found that the SCC had failed to address obvi-
ous deficiencies in its treatment program and noted, "If the IOCC does
not call obvious problems to the attention of SCC managers, obvious
problems seem to go unnoticed or are simply ignored." 288 The report
further found that internal review mechanisms at the SCC were "dys-
functional and have consistently failed to identify key areas for required
improvement to ensure necessary solutions." 289 These problems in-
cluded "use of force, safety violations, and allegations of staff abusing
residents and medical errors."290 The report concluded that "[slince
280 Declaration of Robert Briody §§ 6-7, Turay v. Richards, No. C91-664RSM (WD.
Wash. Mar, 30, 2006) [hereinafter Briody Declaration]. Mr. Briody was Chief of Mental
Health Services for the Oklahoma Department of Corrections and the former Director of
the Florida Civil Commitment Center. Id. § 1.
28 ' Id. § 2.
282 Id. § 7.
283 See jam 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259.
284 See id. at 4-6. The report added, "Supervision is absent or not effective." Id. at 3-4.
288 Id. at 17 .
288 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 6(f) (citing Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra
note 259, at 3-4). The report added, "Thus far training and supervision has not solved this
problem.... [LT]pper-level managers at SCC fail to ensure that mid-level and lower-level
managers are actively and responsibly performing their duties as supervisors of direct-care
staff." Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 6.
287 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 6.
288 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 6(c).
288 Id. § 6(g). The Quality Improvement Committee was one such internal review
mechanism. See id.
290 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 31.
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1999 the IOCC has identified a plethora of serious problems at Ethel
SCC," but these problems have gone uncorrected "because the Quality
Committee and the leadership staff have been less than effective." 29 i
Third, the IOCC found that the SCC consistently failed to ade-
quately integrate medical and psychiatric care into the residents' treat-
ment program.292 The report added that "[c]ollaboration with the
treatment team [was] not evident based on [the IOCC's] clinical File
review" —an "expected protocol" that "must be initiated." 295 The IOCC
found this problem to be especially disconcerting since "all residents
have been assigned a DSM III, Axis I and/or II diagnosis and therefore
have psychiatric needs."294
Fourth, the IOCC identified significant problems in the provision
of health care services.295 Health care services were "disorganized and
poorly managed," and there was a lack of professional nursing prac-
tice."296 The report found that there was "no system to ensure accurate
delivery and tracking of medications" and that "[t] he procedure for
ensuring patient medication compliance is not acceptable." 297 More-
over, the IOCC found "poor staffing patterns, failure to identify staff
assignments and tasks, poor fiscal management, ineffective communi-
cation processes and deteriorating staff morale." 298 Accordingly, the
IOCC "continue[d] to stress the significance of the deficiencies cited
within nursing services at [the] SCC" and emphasized that it "feels
strongly that it is the responsibility of SCC administration to ensure that
the residents' physical and mental health needs are addressed in keep-
ing with best professional practice." 299
Fifth, the IOCC identified deficiencies in the SCC's clinical and
medical files.") The report found that "[t] he frequency of medication.
29 ' See id. at 33.
292 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 6(h). The report noted that "Weview of the
clinical file and treatment plan revealed that medical personnel rarely participate in the
treatment plan development. This particular issue has been noted by the IOCC since
1999." Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 9.
293 jail. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 29.
294 See id. at 10.
295 Id. at 22. The IOCC wrote, We have significant concerns about the level of health
care services provided by the program." Id.
29° Id.
15' 7 Id. at 27.
298 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 22.
299 Id. at 23.
2°9 Id. at 10. The report added, "Since 1999 the SCC administration has provided ex-
cuses for the quality problems and documentation deficiencies in the clinical and medical
files... , None-the-less, quality of file entries and medical and clinical record keeping con-
tinues to be an area of serious and substantial difficulty." Id.
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error is unreported and occurs at a much greater frequency than the
facility's data would indicate and more often than is acceptable given
the number of residents receiving meds."301 In addition, the SCC had
ignored "guidelines and resources" that the IOCC recommended the
SCC "incorporate [] into the protocols for treatment of SCC patients."'"
Sixth, the IOCC found that "repetitive and persistent" personal
sanitation and safety concerns were ignored."' The IOCC believed this
finding was evidence of a more pervasive problem, noting that qt.] he
persistent problems in the areas of room sanitation, obstructions to
emergency egress from rooms, clutter, unauthorized food, patient hy-
giene, shielded light and obstructed visibility are indicative of the direct
care and clinical staff not adequately doing their job."304 The IOCC
underscored that the monitoring of the aging residents' hygiene and
health care needs "is clearly a nursing responsibility and function" that
"need[s] to be an integral part of resident care."305 The IOCC found
that the SCC's disregard for these problems "demonstrates a lack of
appreciation for professional nursing practice and its contribution to
the treatment team."306
Seventh, the IOCC identified a lack of staff professionalism, in-
cluding poor interaction between residents and SCC staff. 3o7 Addition-
ally, the report observed that direct care staff were "not being fair, firm
and consistent (according to policy and procedure) in their treatment
and supervision of residents,"3" and that "[c]omplaints of staff abuse"
had "increased."309 The IOCC observed that staff behavior "has been an
area of concern to both past and present IOC surveyors" and required
further review "in upcoming surveys. "MO
Eighth, the IOCC found that there were significant shortcomings
in external and internal oversight mechanist -m.311 In particular, the
IOCC reported that the SCC had shown disregard for the IOCC and its
"1 Id. at 27.
3°2 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 6(h).
3°3 Id. § 6(i). The report noted there has been "no real improvement" in this area. Id.
304 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 14.
5'35 Id.
3°6 Id. at 23.
3°7 Id. at 4-5. The report noted, 'The IOCC members have frequently witnessed direct
care staff not being attentive to residents in their housing units or on the yard. MCC mem-
bers, past and present, have pointed out this non-involvement since at least 2000." Id. at 5.
3°8 Id. at 6.
309 Jan, 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 18.
31° Id. at 19.
311 Briody Declaration, supra note 280, at § 6(c), (g).
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recommendations. 312
 For example, the January 2006 IOCC Report
noted that, in response to an earlier IOCC recommendation regarding
internal oversight of the program, "the SCC stated that the [Resident
Advisory Committee] would be further developed, taken more seri-
ously and would be regularly meeting with the Superintendent. Instead
it has been disbanded!"319
 The SCC had not reconstituted the Resident
Advisory Committee and, as the IOCC noted, there was "no evidence of
an adequate substitute present to address" resident grievances.314 In-
deed, soon after the IOCC issued its highly critical report, the SCC dis-
banded the IOCC and replaced it with new members selected by the
SCC's superintenden L 315
Finally, the IOCC found that because of the deficiencies in the
SCC's treatment programs "the number of residents participating in
treatment has decreased significantly."316 As a result, the IOCC con-
cluded that the SCC was failing to meet its stated goal of providing
residents with constitutionally adequate treatment. 317
3. The Former Special Master's Submission
The former special master, Dr. Janice Marques, also concluded that
continued judicial supervision was warranted. 918 Dr. Marques submitted
a declaration urging the court to maintain the Turay Injunction until
adequate oversight mechanisms were in place. 5" In particular, Dr.
Marques noted the "long-term pattern of non-responsiveness of SCC
management to problems that have been identified by the 10C." 32° Dr.
Marques declared that the Turay Injunction had been "critical" in com-
pelling the SCC to take any action to improve conditions at the facil-
ity.321 Accordingly, because it was "unclear" that oversight mechanisms
"2 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 1 (discussing that, despite the
IOCC's past suggestions, the same problems persist).
313 Id. at 21.
314 Id.
315
 Turay v. Richards (Order Denying Motion to Dissolve Injunction), No. C91-66416M, at
2 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2006) (detailing the SCC's attempt to appoint new members to the
IOCC),
016 Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 7; Briody Declaration, supra note
280, § 6(d).
Oil Briody Declaration, supra note 280, § 4.
31. 8 Marques Declaration, supra note 42, § 19. Dr. Marques, a clinical psychologist, is a
28-year veteran of the California Department of Mental Health and former president of
the Association for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers. See id. § 1.
319 See id. § 19.
5" See id. § 8.
321 Id. § 18.
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would be "effective in keeping the program on track and accountable,"
Dr. Marques recommended that "judicial supervision should not end
until there is a clear demonstration that external oversight of the pro-
gram is working as the Court intended." 322
E. The District Court's Order Dissolving the Turay Injunction
Despite the SCC's continued failure to provide constitutionally
adequate treatment, in 2007, the district court dissolved the Turay In-
junction.323 The court agreed that residents had submitted substantial
evidence demonstrating the SCC's "backsliding."324 During the pro-
ceedings before the district court, the SCC even conceded that there
were problems with the management and supervision of the SCC's
treatment program:
The IOCC has identified a need for increased supervision of
residential staff. Although this has been a goal of the pro-
gram for quite some time, reaching the goal has been chal-
lenging for the SCC .... With the active growth of the pro-
gram, particularly since the move to the new facility, there
has been the added difficulty of recruiting and hiring ma-
ture individuals within the relatively new classes of supervi-
sors and managers. 325
The SCC also admitted that "the integration of medical and clinical
treatment has been a challenge for the program, as has managing
medical services and staff generally," 326 and it further conceded that the
IOCC's "comments [regarding persistent sanitation and safety prob-
lems] raise valid concerns. "327
The district court had relied on similar findings in the past in con-
cluding that the SCC was not providing constitutionally adequate treat-
322 See id. §§ 16, 19.
323 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WI. 983132, at *1.
324 See id. at *5.
323 See Declaration of Alan McLaughlin at 6, Turay v. Richards, No. C91-664RSM (WM.
Wash. Apr. 3, 2006) (hereinafter McLaughlin Declaration]. Mr. McLaughlin was a long-
term manager at the SCC.
326 Defendants' Response Brief to Plaintiffs' Request for Injunctive Relief on the The-
ory of Backsliding at 32, Turay v. Richards, No. C91-664RSM (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2006)
[hereinafter Defendants' Response Brief]; see also McLaughlin*Declaration, supra note 325,
at 3-4.
327 Defendants' Response Brief, supra note 326, at 34.
1422	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 49:1383
ment.328 Indeed, when the IOCC had previously issued similarly critical
reports, the SCC had conceded that it failed to meet "minimum profes-
sional standards. "329
Nonetheless, the district court dissolved the injunction and denied
the residents' request to present additional evidence during an eviden-
tiary hearing. 330 Eight days before the court dissolved the Turay Injunc-
tion, the SCC submitted a mandatory status report to the court stating
that the reconstituted IOCC had given a preliminary briefing to the
SCC and would issue a final report "within the next thirty days."331
Nonetheless, the district court did not wait for the new IOCC report. 332
Instead, it promptly dissolved the Turay Injunction, stating, "This case
has been troublesome to the Court in that there seems to be no right
answer, and no good fix for the situation these plaintiffs face at the
SCC."333 Although the court shared the "sense of frustration obviously
felt by ... the residents"3" and acknowledged that the issues they raised
were "serious," the court still granted the State's motion and dissolved
the injunction.333
The district court simply asserted, without analysis, that the SCC's
backsliding did not "rise to the level of a Constitutional violation." 336
Although the Ninth Circuit had previously held that the district court
329 See, e.g., Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151-53, 1159-60 (W.D. Wash. 2000)
(citing the 1999 IOCC Report and other evidence demonstrating the SCC's failure to pro-
vide adequate treatment in denying the SCC's motion to dissolve the Turay Injunction).
"9 See id. at 1153. For example, in its May 2000 findings, the district court observed
that such concessions were "inevitable in view of the IOC Report," which contained similar
criticisms regarding the deficiencies in the SCC's treatment program. See id.; see also Turay
v. Seling (Feb. 26, 2003 Order), No. C91-664R, slip op. at 17 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 26, 2003)
("The recent IOC report appears to document precisely the kind of backsliding that the
contempt was designed to forestall."); Dec. 20, 2000 Order, slip op. at 9 ("The IOC report is
of great value in helping the SCC toward the goal of constitutionally adequate mental
health treatment."); Non 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-7 (observing that the SCC had ex-
pressed agreement with the findings and recommendations of both the IOC and the Spe-
cial Master).
333 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *1; Turay v. Rich-
ards ( JO 26, 2006 Order on Scope of Hearing), No. C91-0664RSM, slip op. at 2 (W.D. Wash.
July 26, 2006).
33' See Turay v. Richards, No. C91-664RSM, at 3 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2007) (SCC's
March 2007.Progress Report).
332 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *1 (ordering the
dissolution of the Turay Injunction without considering the latest IOCC Report).
333 See id. at *5.
"4 See Sept. 18, 2006 Transcript, supra note 42, at 33-34.
"3 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *5; Sept. 18, 2006
Transcript, supra note 42, at 34.
"4 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *3.
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must look "beyond the SCC administrators' assertions of compli-
ance,"337 and could not "defer to the professional judgment of the SCC
superintendent and clinical director," the district court based its con-
clusions on the assertions of SCC staff regarding "ongoing efforts by
the SCC program managers to improve the program." 3" The district
court did not address any of the specific findings in the IOCC reports
documenting "persistent," "pervasive," and "serious," problems in the
SCC's treatment program.'" The court also did not mention the for-
mer special master's recommendation that court oversight should con-
tinue given the long-term pattern of non-responsiveness of SCC man-
agement to problems that have been identified by the IOC," and the
fact that there had been no "demonstration that external oversight of
the program is working as the Court intended." 4° Instead, the district
Court relied heavily on the length of time the Turay Injunction had
been in place and asserted that "injunctions against the state are not
intended to operate in perpetuity."341 Thus, in the final analysis, the
district court seems to have simply given up in attempting to secure the
SCC's compliance with its constitutional obligations. 342
V. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE CONSTITUTIONALLY ADEQUATE
TREATMENT REQUIREMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY
OF CIVIL COMMITMENT
Both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Washington Supreme Court
have specifically relied on the Turay Injunction to provide sufficient
relief to residents challenging the constitutionality of Washington's civil
commitment scheme." The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that,
where treatment is possible, it is constitutionally required. 344 Otherwise,
"7 Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2000).
158 Id.; see Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5.
339 See id.;Jan. 31, 2006 IOCC REPORT, supra note 259, at 1, 14, 17, 33.
340 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5; Marques
Declaration, supra note 42, §§ 8, 16, 18-19.
341 See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *5.
342 See id.
343 See Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 265-66 (2001) ("Our decision today does not
mean that respondent [has] no remedy for the alleged conditions and treatment regime at
the Center.... [W]e note that a § 1983 action against the Center is pending in the West-
ern District of Washington.... [and that] [t] he Center operates under an injunction
• ."); In re Detention of Campbell, 986 P.2d 771, 776 (Wash. 1999) ("[The court]
agree[s] with the trial court that the proper relief under the circumstances is to remedy
any constitutional defects in the administration of the SCC. Remediation is already ongo-
ing under the direction of the federal district court.").
344 See Sehng, 531 U.S. at 261-62; Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 366 (1997).
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civil commitment becomes punitive and thus criminal in nature, and
the potentially indefinite confinement violates the detainees' due proc-
ess rights.345 The treatment requirement is therefore fundamental.
Nonetheless, the SCC litigation demonstrates the difficult and intracta-
ble problems that have arisen in attempting to provide constitutionally
adequate treatment. 346
A The Treatment Dilemma
The SCC litigation's seventeen-year history demonstrates the in-
herent difficulty in enforcing government compliance with the treat-
ment requirement.347 To the extent that enforcing the treatment re-
quirement involves significant costs, civil commitment becomes a less
attractive alternative to protect the public from potentially dangerous
in d ividuals.' 48
Moreover, the benefits of treatment are far from clear. 349 Does
treatment reduce recidivism? Can it reduce the dangerousness of sexu-
ally violent predators such that the risks of releasing them into society
are acceptable? There is a strong and ongoing scientific debate regard-
ing these questions, and, as a result, there are significant concerns re-
garding the potential benefits of civil commitment and treatment pro-
grams.")
Finally, the recalcitrance of government officials to provide consti-
tutionally adequate treatment suggests that, from the beginning, they
did not intend to use civil commitment to rehabilitate offenders. 351 In-
stead, their actions demonstrate a desire to use civil commitment as a
345 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 261-62; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 366.
345 See, e.g., Turay v. Richards (Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction), No. C91-
0664RSM, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2007); Turay v. Seling (Nov. 15,
1999 Order), No. C91-664WD, slip op. at 6-18 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 15, 1999).
547 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5; Nou
15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18.
349 See Friedland, supra note 70, at 130-31 ("[T] he available data indicates that the cost
of civil commitment will be much higher to a state than the equivalent cost of imprison-
ment and treatment.... [The treatment] programs will be 'enormously expensive' and
hard to implement." (quoting Rael Jean Isaac, Editorial, Put Sex Predators Behind Bars, not
on the Couch, WALL Si. J., May 8,1998, at A14)); Janus, supra note 9, at 1236 (noting that
"SVP programs are very expensive").
349 See Berliner, supra note 70, at 1209-11 (discussing the ongoing debate regarding
the effectiveness of treating sex offenders); Weeks, supra note 70, at 1291-93 (same).
55° See Berliner, supra note 70, at 1209-11 (summarizing recent studies manifesting
"difficulties in confirming treatment effectiveness"); Weeks, supra note 70, at 1293 (noting
that there has been a lively dispute on that point among scholars").
151 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL, 983132, at *4-5; Nov
15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18.
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means to warehouse potentially dangerous defendants after their
criminal sentences have expired. 352 Thus, although the Supreme Court
has upheld civil commitment statutes because they typically mandate
treatment and thus do not have a solely punitive purpose, in practice,
the promise of treatment has not been fulfillec1. 353
The SCC litigation demonstrates the potential drawbacks of rely-
ing primarily on the statutory text and legislative history in determin-
ing whether a civil commitment scheme meets constitutional re-
quirements. 354 A state's actions, however, often tell a much different
story. If the State of Washington were truly interested ill providing
adequate, statutorily required treatment, court supervision would not
have lasted seventeen years. 355 Nor would there still be undisputed
problems in the SCC's treatment prOgram—a fact even the district
court acknowledged when it dissolved the Turay Injunction. 556
Thus, the SCC litigation demonstrates that focusing exclusively on
the statutory text suffers from significant problems. 357 States may be
able to enact statutes that declare treatment as a goal, but in practice,
that goal may prove to be a sham.358 Although statutes may pay lip ser-
vice to the goal of treatment, they often seem designed solely to further
incapacitate and, in some circumstances, punish defendants. 359
"2 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5; Nov.
15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18.
.353 See Seling, 531 U.S. at 260-61; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 348; Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S.
364, 373-74 (1986).
354 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5; Nov.
15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18. .
3" See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *1-2.
35° See id. at *4-5.
967 This was an approach advocated by Justices Thomas and Scalia in their concur-
rences in Seling. See 531 U.S. at 267-70 (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 271-74 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
355 See Friedland, supra note 70, at 115 (arguing that, in the.context of the Kansas civil
commitment statute upheld in Hendricks, "treatment was only a veneer covering the true
legislative intent—dressing.up a criminal wolf in a civil sheep's clothing"); Janus & Logan,
supra note 115, at 321 (arguing that, "in practice, the promised treatment most often goes
unredeemed"); Weeks, supra note 70, at 1262 ("Given society's demonstrated abhorrence
of sexual deviants, any suggestion that sex offender laws are enacted out of an altruistic
interest in 'care and treatment' of sexual offenders is inherently insincere.").
355 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 71.09.010 (West 1990); Nou 15, 1999 Order, slip
op. at 6-18 (detailing the SCC's continued failure to provide constitutionally adequate
treatment). Even without this potential problem, many academics have argued that civil
commitment statutes for sexually violent predators are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Morris,
supra note 70, at 1205 ("Despite their popularity with state legislatures, scholars have de-
nounced SW legislation and have condemned the Hendricks decision—especially Justice
Thomas's majority opinion—for upholding their constitutionality."). The Washington civil
commitment statute was criticized soon after its enactment. Seefohn Q. La Fond, Washing-
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B. Potential Alternatives
One potential alternative to civil commitment programs is to in-
crease the penalties for crimes involving sexual violence. 360 Although
tougher criminal penalties may create less flexibility in dealing with in-
dividual violators, they have the advantage of avoiding the extensive
costs associated with civil commitment„ 361
 Indeed, the SCC litigation
suggests that civil commitment programs, in many instances, are simply
after-the-fact attempts to impose additional punishment. 362 Jurisdictions
that impose weak penalties for crimes of sexual violence may seek civil
commitment as a backstop to impose additional incarceration and en-
sure that individuals who are clearly dangerous are not allowed to reen-
ter society.363 . Thus, in a state like Washington, which had historically
taken a lax, if not permissive, approach to sexually violent offenses, the
statutory scheme has functioned solely to further incapacitate criminal
defendants.364
Moreover, judicial supervision has proven ineffective in addressing
these problems. 363 In Washington, after seventeen years of involvement,
the courts have abandoned their efforts to enforce compliance in pro-
ton's Sexually Violent Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse of the Therapeutic State for Social Coning
15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 655 (1992) (arguing that the Washington Civil Commitment
Program imposes additional punishment). But see Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutional-
ity and Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predawn, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. Rev. 709
(1992) (arguing that civil commitment presents the best method to deal with sexually vio-
lent predators).
36° See Brian D. Gallagher, Now That We Know Where They Are, What Do We Do With Them?:
The Placement of Sex Offenders in the Age of Megan's Law, 7 WIDENER J. Pus. L. 39, 61-64
(1997); Stephen R. McAllister, The Constitutionality of Kansas Laws Targeting Sex Offenders, 36
WASHBURN L.J. 419, 433 (1997); Vitiello, supra note 4, at 651; Sarah E. Agudo, Comment,
Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy of Sex Offender Residency Laws, 102 Nw.
U. L. Rev. 307, 335 (2008).
361 See Agudo, supra note 360, at 337 (discussing the costs associated with civil laws de-
signed to confine or monitor sexual offenders); Peter C. Pfaffenroth, Note, The Need for
Coherence: States' Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders in the Wake of Kansas v. Crane, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 2229, 2262 (2003) (discussing the need to consider the extensive costs of civil com-
mitment programs).
362
 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5 (dis-
cussing the SCC's continued failure to provide constitutionally adequate treatment); Nov.
.15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18 (imposing contempt sanctions on the SCC after it repeat-
edly failed to comply with court orders).
363 See Vitiello, supra note 4, at 682-83 (discussing the civil penalties that states often
impose on sex offenders even after the completion of their criminal sentences).
364 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5; Nou
15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18.
365 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5 (dis-
solving the injunction despite the SCC's failure to provide constitutionally adequate treat-
ment); Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18.
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viding constitutionally adequate treatment, at least in part due to the
length of the prior judicial supenision. 366 The courts abandoned their
supervision despite the fact that "mere passage of time" is an insuffi-
cient basis for dissolving an•injunction. 367
More fundamentally, the primary reason the Turay Injunction was
in place for seventeen years was the SCC's repeated and undisputed
noncompliance with constitutional requirements.368 Thus, the district
court's dissolution of the injunction threatens to reward the SCC for its
willful noncompliance. 369 Indeed, prior noncompliance generally war-
rants continued judicial supervision, not dissolution of a court's injunc-
tion.37° Thus, the litigation's final result has, in effect, produced what the
Supreme Court has prohibited: the "warehousing" of detainees whose
criminal sentences have expired under the guise of civil commitment. 371
Under these circumstances, there exists a powerful argument that
the costs of civil commitment outweigh the costs associated with in-
creased criminal penalties for sexually violent crimes. 372
 Because the
state's motivation appears to be incapacitation and further punishment,
simply increasing criminal penalties would be preferable to enacting
civil commitment schemes. 373 Civil commitment programs inevitably
become the subject of extensive litigation, as states are reluctant to pro-
33° See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *5 (citing the
length of the Turay Injunction as a reason for its dissolution).
387 See, e.g., SEC v. Worthen, 98 F.3d 480, 482 (9th Cir. 1996) ('The mere passage of
time, however, does not constitute a ground for relief from an 'obey the law' injunction
."); Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Phila. v. NLRB, 64 F.3d 880, 889 (3d Cir. 1995)
("[W)e are unwilling to hold ... that the mere passage of time and temporary compliance
are themselves sufficient to constitute the type of changed circumstances that warrant
lifting of an injunction . • • .").
36a See Nov. 15, 1999 Order„ slip op. at 6-18 (documenting the SCC's repeated failures
to comply with court orders to improve the treatment program).
36° See Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *5.
37° See Rd. of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 247-49 (1991) (holding that defendants
must demonstrate that constitutional requirements are being met and that they are
unlikely to "return to [their] former ways" before an injunction will be dissolved).
37/ See, e.g., Seling, 531 U.S. at 256-57; Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 348; Allen, 478 U.S. at 373-
74; Turay v. Seling, 108 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1151 (W.D. Wash. 2000) ("[T] hese plaintiffs, and
others involuntarily confined through civil proceedings, cannot simply be warehoused and
put out of sight; they must be afforded adequate treatment.").
373 See Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18 (documenting the SCC's repeated failures to
comply with court orders to improve the treatment program); Agudo, supra note 360, at
337 (discussing the costs associated with civil laws designed to confine or monitor sexual
offenders); Pfaffenroth, supra note 361, at 2257 & n.173, 2262 (discussing the need to
consider the extensive costs of civil commitment programs).
373 See Nov 15, 1999 Orrkr, slip op. at 6-18 (documenting the SCC's repeated failures to
comply with court orders to improve the treatment program).
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vide adequate treatment programs that provide a pathway to eventual
release. 374
There are costs associated with such an approach that should not
be discounted. Increasing criminal penalties across the board may
leave prosecutors less discretion to seek just sentences based on the
individual facts and circumstances of each case. 375
 Moreover, some
argue convictions may be more difficult to obtain if there are strin-
gent mandatory minimum sentences. 378 Finally, there are the obvious
costs of lengthier confinements.377 Nonetheless, given the problems
associated with civil commitment, 378
 coupled with the deficiencies in
treatment programs, these costs arguably pale in comparison to the
costs being incurred under the current civil commitment system. 379
CONCLUSION
The debate over the costs and benefits of civil commitment and its
associated constitutional concerns is likely to continue for many years
to come. The experience under Washington's civil commitment pro-
gram, however, raises significant concerns regarding the utility of civil
commitment as a means of protecting society from potentially danger-
374 See, e.g., Sharp v. Weston, 233 F.3d 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2000); 71tray, 108 F. Supp. 2d
at 1148; Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18 (noting the numerous court orders regarding
the treatment programs at the SCC).
"5 See Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Conipromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1, 14 (1988) (noting the reduced flexibility given to
judges with the creation of strict mandatory minimum sentences).
376 Compare Norbert L. Kerr, Severity of Prescribed Penalty and Mock Jurors' qrdiar, 36 J.
PERS. & Soc. Psvcnot.. 1431, 1439 (1978) (concluding that studies showed that an in-
crease in the severity of the prescribed penalty for an offence" led to an adjustment of
subjects' conviction criteria such that more proof of guilt was required for conviction" and,
as a result, there was "a reduced probability of conviction"), with Dennis J. Devine et al.,
Jury Decisionmaking, 7 PsvcnoL. Pug. POLY & L. 622, 671 (2001) (summarizing literature
showing that "mandatory sentence length (0-2 years vs. 15 or more years) did not affect
verdicts" and that there was only "a negligible difference in conviction rates as a function
of sentence severity").
s77
	 Berliner, supra note 70, at 1215 ('The substantial increased costs associated with
incarcerating more (sexually violent] criminals for longer periods of time is a price citizens
are willing to pay for immediate community safety.").
"8 See, e.g., Order Granting Motion to Dissolve Injunction, 2007 WL 983132, at *4-5 (dis-
solving the injunction despite the SCC's failure to provide constitutionally adequate treat-
ment); Nov. 15, 1999 Order, slip op. at 6-18.
379
 Given the seriousness of these crimes and the potential danger to society, doing
nothing is simply not an option. See Paul H. Robinson, Punishing Dangerousness: Cloaking
Preventive Detention as Criminal Justice, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1429, 1456 (2001) ("The inevitable
pressure for protection [from potentially dangerous individuals] will express itself in one
form or another.").
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ous sexual offenders. The litigation-imposes significant costs on both
states and the judicial system. Washington, though, has persisted in its
refusal to comply with its constitutional obligations to provide adequate
treatment. This recalcitrance manifests an intent to incapacitate, if not
punish, rather than provide the treatment mandated by the applicable
Washington statute and the United States Constitution. In essence, the
Washington scheme is serving as a highly inefficient means of imposing
additional criminal "punishment."
As such, one must ask whether increasing criminal penalties for
sexually violent predators would be preferable to the current .system.
Not only are there significant constitutional concerns associated with
civil commitment, but there are also extensive economic costs. Aban-
doning civil commitment in favor of increased criminal penalties— ac-
companied by constitutional guarantees found in the criminal system—
would arguably mitigate these Costs, and, at the same time, avoid many
of the constitutional pitfalls associated with civil commitment.
